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ARTICLE
Vincent R. Johnson

Legal Malpractice Litigation and the Duty to Report
Misconduct
Abstract. Lawyers participating in legal malpractice litigation sometimes
encounter evidence of serious disciplinary rule violations. Whether, and how
soon, those lawyers are required to report this information to grievance
authorities is a question that has received little attention from courts and
scholars, despite the fact that most states have mandatory reporting rules. The
dilemma for lawyers serving as testifying experts is particularly troublesome
because nonreporting may result not only in discipline, but testimonial
impeachment. The better view is that an expert in a pending case ordinarily
has no mandatory obligation to report misconduct. This conclusion is
supported by an analysis of the narrowness of the reporting obligation, the
exceptions to the rule, public policy considerations related to malpractice
litigation and grievance procedures, and customary professional practices.
However, after litigation ends, an expert (and other lawyers) may have a duty
to call evidence of serious misconduct to the attention of disciplinary
authorities.
Author. Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas. B.A., LL.D., St. Vincent College; J.D., University of Notre
Dame; LL.M., Yale University. Professor Johnson's books include Legal
MalpracticeLaw: Problems and Prevention (Thomson/West 2008) (with Susan
Saab Fortney) and LegalMalpracticeLaw in a Nutshell (West 2011).
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I. THE DILEMMA
A. Testifying Experts
Experts who testify in legal malpractice cases sometimes encounter
indisputable evidence of lawyer misconduct, such as documentary proof of
an impermissible fee agreement' or a settlement offer imposing improper
restrictions on a lawyer's right to practice. 2 In these instances, does the
expert have a duty to report the errant lawyer to disciplinary authorities? If
the expert is a licensed lawyer-as is usually true in legal malpractice
cases 3-the operative rule, at first blush, would seem to impose a reporting
obligation. In virtually all states, the ethics code for lawyers contains a
provision similar to one in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
With exceptions, discussed below,' Model Rule 8.3 states in mandatory
terms:
(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of the
Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a substantial question as to that
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, shall
inform the appropriate professional authority.5

1. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.5(d) (2010) (prohibiting certain types
of contingent fees).
2. See id. R. 5.6(b) ("A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making . .. an agreement in
which a restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement of a client controversy.").
3. There are rare exceptions. Some experts are law professors who teach professional
responsibility but are not currently licensed to practice law. In certain states, there are strict
requirements. For example, in Georgia, "'an expert in a professional malpractice action must be
licensed and practicing (or teaching) in one of the states of the United States at the time the alleged
negligent act occurred.'" Wilson v. McNeely, No. A10A2268, 2011 WL 198378, at *1 (Ga. Ct.
App. Jan. 24, 2011) (quoting Craigo v. Azizi, 687 S.E.2d 198, 203 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)) (excluding
testimony in a legal malpractice case).
4. See infra Part III (discussing the confidentiality limitation on disclosure).
5. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010). Under Model Rule 8.3(a), there is
no duty to report one's own misconduct because the reporting obligation arises only when there is
knowledge of a violation by "another lawyer." Id.; see also Conn. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Profl Ethics,
Informal Op. 38 (1997), available at 1997 WL 816059 (finding that a lawyer who embezzled trust
funds had no duty to report his own misconduct). However, some state ethics codes have been
interpreted as also requiring self-reporting. See Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline,
Informal Op. 001 (2007), availableat 2007 WL 1232241 ("A lawyer is required to self-report his or
her professional misconduct, as well as report others' misconduct . . . ."). Applicable state law usually
requires a lawyer to report that discipline has been imposed on a lawyer in another jurisdiction. See
id. (discussing the duty to report under Ohio State Bar R. V, § 11(F)(1)).
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Similar language can be found in the Restatement (Third) of the Law
Governing Lauyers (Restatement),6 the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct,7 and the ethics codes of numerous states.' Only a
few jurisdictions have language or procedures to the contrary. California
has never adopted a reporting rule. 9 In addition, the ethics codes in
Georgia1 o and Washington" provide that a lawyer with knowledge of
6. The language in the Restatement is virtually identical to the text of the Model Rules. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5(3) (2000) ("A lawyer who knows

of another lawyer's violation of applicable rules of professional conduct raising a substantial question
of the lawyer's honesty or trustworthiness or the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer in some other respect
must report that information to appropriate disciplinary authorities.").
7. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.03(a), reprinted in TEX. GOVT

CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9) ("Except as
permitted in paragraphs (c) [(addressing confidential client information)] or (d) [(regarding
confidential information gained in "an approved peer assistance program")], a lawyer having
knowledge that another lawyer has committed a violation of applicable rules of professional conduct
that raises a substantial question as to that lawyers honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects, shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.").
8. See generally STEVEN GILLERS ET AL., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND

STANDARDS (2010 ed.) (detailing variations in states' ethics codes).
9. See Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A Current Look at Model Rule 8.3: How Is It Used
and What Are Courts Doing About It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 747, 755 (2003) (indicating that
California has not adopted the reporting requirement). Recently, the California State Bar Board of
Governors considered adopting a very limited reporting rule, which provided in part:
Rule 8.3 Reporting Professional Misconduct
(a) A lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a felonious criminal act that
raises a substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
shall inform the appropriate disciplinary authority.
(b) Except as required by paragraph (a), a lawyer may, but is not required to, report to the
State Bar a violation of these Rules or the State Bar Act.
Comm'n for the Revision of the Rules of Profl Conduct, State Bar of Cal., Rules & Concepts that
Were Considered but Are Not Recommended for Adoption 2010, http://ethics.calbar.ca.gov/
LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=_.wFtsNXUZ84%3d&tabid=2669 (last visited May 9, 2011). The rule,
however, was not adopted. Id.
10. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010). "There is no disciplinary penalty for a
violation of this Rule." Id. R. 8.3.
11. WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010). In 2004, the Washington State Bar
Association Board of Governors recommended that the Model Rule version of Rule 8.3 be adopted,
rejecting the recommendation of the sharply divided state bar Ethics 2003 Committee to retain nonmandatory reporting. See Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Bd. of Governors' Revisions to Ethics 2003
Committee Recommendation 20-21 (July 2004), http://wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/
boardofgovernorsrevisionswithcomments.doc (reporting the Ethics 2003 Committee's decision
declining the recommended adoption of Model Rule 8.3). The Washington Supreme Court did not
adopt the change; no reason was given. See Explanatory Memorandum from the Wash. State Bar
Ass'n to the Ethics 2003 Committee on Proposed Rules of Profl Conduct 212-13 (March 2004)
(hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum), available at http://wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003
/reportpart3.doc (indicating that the majority of the Washington Supreme Court concluded that
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misconduct "should[, not shall,] inform the appropriate professional

authority." 1 2
Model Rule 8.3 contains no express exception to the reporting duty for
lawyers serving as experts. Moreover, the obligations imposed by the
reporting rule, unlike many other ethical strictures, do not hinge upon
whether the lawyer is "representing" a client. 13 The predicate for action is
simply whether "[a] lawyer . . . knows"" that serious misconduct1 5 has
been committed. (In this Article, "serious misconduct" is a shorthand
reference to "a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects," as that phrase is used in Model Rule 8.3 and
similar state provisions.) 16
The risk behind the reporting dilemma is not so much that the lawyer
serving as a testifying expert would be subject to discipline for failure to
report the infraction. 1 7 With notable examples to the contrary,'" lawyers
permissive reporting should be retained).
12. GA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010); WASH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 8.3(a) (2010).
13. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2010) ("In representinga client, a
lawyer shall exercise independent professional judgment...." (emphasis added)); id. R. 4.2 ("In
representinga client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a
party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter. . . ." (emphasis added));
id. R. 4.4 ("In representinga client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose
other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . .. " (emphasis added)); see also ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal. Op. 433 (2004) ("Most, but by no means all,
ethical duties under the Model Rules spring from a lawyer's representation of clients.").
14. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010); see infra Part II(B) (discussing the

knowledge requirement).
15. Model Rule 8.4 defines "misconduct" as including: a direct or indirect violation or
attempted violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct; certain criminal acts, "conduct involving
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"; and "conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice," including knowingly assisting a judge or judicial candidate in violating the
rules governing judicial conduct, or representing that one has the ability to improperly influence a
judge. Id R. 8.4.
16. Id. R. 8.3.
17. A distinction is drawn between testifying experts and consulting experts. See ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) (stating that a lawyer serving as a testifying
expert witness does not "provide a 'law-related service'. . . within the purview of Model Rule 5.7
such as would render his services as a testifying expert subject to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct"). The hallmark of the former is independence and objectivity. See id. (opining that a
testifying expert "is presented as objective and must provide opinions adverse to the party for whom
he expects to testify if frankness so dictates"). In contrast, consulting experts are normally akin to
partisan advocates, serving as a type of associated co-counsel. See id. (stating that "zealous partisan
advocacy [is] characteristic of an expert consultant"). This Article is concerned with the duties of
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are rarely sanctioned for that type of conduct.'
For example, there are
currently more than 86,400 active members of the State Bar of Texas. 2 0
Grievances resulting in the imposition of sanctions are reported monthly
in the Texas Bar Journal.2 1 During the five-year period from 2006
through 2010, published reports indicate that only one lawyer was
sanctioned for violating the duty to report knowledge of misconduct by
another lawyer. 2 2
The real risk for the legal malpractice expert (or, more accurately, for the
client at whose behest the expert appears) is that the expert's failure to
report will be exploited for partisan litigation purposes. Specifically, a
lawyer-expert might be subjected to cross-examination and impeachment

testifying experts.
18. See, e.g., In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1249-50 (La. 2005) (publicly reprimanding a
lawyer who had a firm belief that a former prosecutor had suppressed exculpatory evidence in a
criminal case but failed to make a prompt report of the misconduct to the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel); In re Daley, No. 98 SH 2, 2000 WL 1844454, at *8-9 (Ill. Att'y Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n Aug. 8, 2000) (imposing a nine-month suspension based in part on failure to
report misconduct); see also In re Hampton, No. 03-0918, 2005 WL 6317758, at *8 (Ariz.
Disciplinary Comm'n June 9, 2005) (stating that in In re Lustig, No. SB-01-02149-D (Ariz. Sep. 7,
2001), a lawyer was censured based in part on failing to report another lawyer's "misconduct of fee
sharing with a non-lawyer"). In In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988), a well-known and
controversial decision, a lawyer was suspended from practice for one year for not reporting
misconduct. Id at 796. Himmel was the first case to discipline a lawyer for nothing other than
failing to report another lawyer's misconduct. RONALD D. ROTUNDA & MICHAEL I. KRAUSS,
LEGAL ETHICS IN A NUTSHELL 447 (2006).

19. "[Flew reported lawyer-discipline decisions involve claimed violations of such a rule."
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i, reporters' note (2000)

(citing a small number of cases); see also Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 13
(2004), availableat 2004 WL 3413897 ("Lawyer discipline cases involving only a charge of failure to
report another lawyer's professional misconduct are rare."); THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D.
ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 56 (10th ed. 2008)

(describing the reporting rule as "one of the most underenforced rules of professional conduct").
20. About Us FAQs, STATE BAR OF TEX., http://www.texasbar.com/AM/Template.cfm?Section
=AboutUs_FAQs&Template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=10 4 32#many (last visited
May 9, 2011).
21. See, e.g., DisciplinaryActions, 74 TEX. B.J. 101, 162-65 (2011) (listing recent resignations
in lieu of discipline, suspensions, and reprimands).
22. This research was performed by Katy Stein, a reference librarian at St. Mary's University
School of Law. In the case where discipline was imposed, the BarJournalentry indicated that a 33year-old San Antonio lawyer "accepted a two-year, fully probated suspension" because the "[tlhe
285th District Court of Bexar County found that [the lawyer] failed to inform the appropriate
disciplinary authority of the professional misconduct of another lawyer." Disciplinary Actions, 69
TEx. B.J. 178, 181 (2006). The lawyer was "ordered to pay $2,500 in attorney's fees and costs." Id.
The lawyer's failure to report was apparently the only violation of the ethics rules at issue or
established. Id.
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in the malpractice case based on failure to file a grievance. It is easy to
picture a lawyer representing a malpractice defendant demanding of the
plaintiffs expert, in front of the jury: "Well, if this was such a serious
example of lawyer misconduct, why didn't you file a grievance like the
Rules require? Aren't you the one who has acted unethically?"
There is a paucity of legal authority dealing directly with the question of
whether malpractice experts have a duty to report. In fact, there are no
published court decisions or ethics opinions expressly addressing the issue.
However, the reporting obligation is often expansively construed. For
example, an American Bar Association ethics opinion opined that there is a
duty to report misconduct by a "non-practicing lawyer... . even if it
involves activity completely removed from the practice of law." 2 3 As one
illustration, the committee indicated that a member of the bar serving on a
law faculty has a duty to contact disciplinary authorities upon learning of
"misconduct by another law professor who is a licensed lawyer exclusively
engaged in teaching." 2 4 According to the committee, "[elven misconduct
arising from purely personal activity must be reported if it reflects adversely
on the lawyer's fitness to practice law." 2 5 Viewed against this backdrop,
the idea that a legal malpractice expert might have a duty to report
knowledge of misconduct related to the malpractice action is hardly
fanciful.
Nevertheless, the better view is that an expert in a pending legal
malpractice case ordinarily has no mandatory obligation to file a report of
malpractice-related misconduct with disciplinary authorities.?
As
discussed below, this conclusion is supported by an analysis of the
narrowness of the reporting obligation (see Part II), the exceptions to the
rule (see Part III), public policy considerations related to malpractice
litigation and grievance procedures (see Part IV), and customary
professional practices (see Part V). However, after malpractice litigation
ends, an expert may have a duty to call evidence of a serious disciplinary
rule violation to the attention of grievance authorities (see Part VI).

23. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Proff Responsibility, Formal. Op. 433 (2004).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. But see infra Part V(A) (discussing instances of reporting in cases of "reasonably certain
future harm").
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B. MalpracticeLitigators
Lawyers representing parties to a malpractice lawsuit presumably will
learn about the same serious misconduct that comes to the attention of a
testifying expert. However, because those lawyers normally do not take the
witness stand, there is little risk that nonreporting will result in their
testimonial impeachment. There is still the risk of discipline, but that risk
is greatly reduced by the fact there is a broad exception to the reporting
obligation that relates to confidential client information (see Part III).
Thus, the reporting dilemma arising from misconduct unearthed in a legal
malpractice case is far more problematic for testifying experts than for
other lawyers involved in the lawsuit. Accordingly, this Article will focus
primarily on the reporting duties of testifying experts, mindful of the fact
that many of the same principles will be applicable in scrutinizing the
reporting duties of malpractice litigators.
In some cases, a lawyer has a duty to report another lawyer's misconduct
to an affected client.2 7 The resolution of that type of issue in the context of
civil liability is sometimes influenced by whether the lawyer also had a duty
to report the misconduct to disciplinary authorities."
Notwithstanding
the importance of issues related to client disclosure obligations,2 9 this
27. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 456-60 (West
2011) (discussing a lawyer's limited duty to disclose his or her own malpractice to clients).
28. See Nathan M. Crystal, Professionalism and Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers, 20 S.C.
LAW., July 2008, at 8, 8 (discussing Estate ofSpencer v. Gavin, 946 A.2d 1051 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2008)). Because the opinion in Estate ofSpencer is complex, it is difficult to fully understand the
reach of the New Jersey appellate court's holding. A lawyer represented the estates of a mother and
her two daughters. Estate ofSpencer, 946 A.2d at 1055. A second lawyer, enlisted by the first lawyer,
did a small amount of work related to only one of the three estates. Id. at 1058. The appellate court
stated that if the second lawyer knew that the first lawyer was misappropriating funds from the
estates, he could be liable to all three estates for harm resulting from nondisclosure of that
information. Id. at 1066-68. One of the estates was a client of the second lawyer because he did
legal work for it. Id. at 1066-67. Consequently, there were several grounds on which the second
lawyer could be liable to that estate for harm caused by nondisclosure. Viable theories of liability
presumably included at least negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent
misrepresentation. However, the court recognized that the other two estates, even if classified as
"non-clients," could also state a claim for damages. Id. at 1067. According to the court, "an attorney
may be liable to a nonclient in certain situations where the attorney knows, or should know, that the
nonclient will rely on the attorney." Id. (citing Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354 (N.J. 1995)).
Because the three estates were interrelated in terms of their disposition of assets, such reliance was to
be expected.
29. See Vincent R. Johnson, "Absoluteand Perfect Candor" to Clients, 34 ST. MARY'S L.J. 737,
742-50 (2003) (discussing duties arising under the principles governing negligence and fiduciary
duty); Vincent R. Johnson & Shawn M. Lovorn, Misrepresentationby Lawyers About Credentials or
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Article focuses solely on whether a lawyer, serving as an expert, has a duty
to report misconduct that is enforceable by professional discipline rather
than whether failing to make disclosure to the affected client could subject
an expert to civil liability.3 0
The following discussion frequently cites ethics opinions issued by
various national, state, and local advisory committees. While these
opinions are not binding on courts or disciplinary authorities, 3 ' they are
important to attaining a proper understanding of the duty to report
misconduct because they generally reflect the wisdom, understanding, and
customs of responsible lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Lawyers are
rarely subject to discipline for actions undertaken in reliance on the advice
offered in pertinent ethics opinions addressing similar facts.
II.

THE NARROW DUTY To REPORT

The duty to report misconduct is a controversial, 3 3 albeit now wellExperience, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 529, 536-76 (2004) (discussing duties arising under the law of fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, and informed consent).
30. There is ordinarily no attorney-client relationship between a testifying expert witness and
the client on whose behalf the expert has been engaged. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl
Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997); see discussion infra Part VI(G)(3) (identifying the
independent nature of a testifying expert witness). Therefore, a testifying expert could be liable for
failure to disclose only on some theory of nonclient liability. There are at least a dozen theories under
which nonclients sometimes prevail in actions against lawyers. SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT
R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE IAW: PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 134-36 (2007). Many of

these theories of liability are recognized even in "strict privity" states. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON,
LEGAL MALPRACTICE

IAW IN A NUTSHELL

161 (West 2011).

31. See Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof'1 Guidance Comm., Op. 2008-12 (2009), available at 2009 WL
467850, for an example of a typical disclaimer. In a footnote the committee stated:
The foregoing opinion is advisory only and is based upon the facts set forth above. The opinion
is not binding upon the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania or any other
Court. It carries only such weight as an appropriate reviewing authority may choose to give it.
Id.; see also Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Informal Op. 001 (2007), available at
2007 WL 1232241 ("Advisory Opinions of the Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline are informal, nonbinding opinions in response to prospective or hypothetical
questions. . . .").
32. See

CHARLES

W.

WOLFRAM,

MODERN

LEGAL

ETHICS

67

(1986)

("Most

jurisdictions . .. seem to defer to ethics opinions to the extent that a lawyer who has acted in
accordance with a recent ethics committee recommendation is ordinarily given the benefit of the
doubt in disciplinary proceedings.").
33. See Explanatory Memorandum 212 (March 2004), available at hrtp://wsba.org/
lawyers/groups/ethics2003/reportpart3.doc (describing the mandatory duty to report professional
misconduct as controversial); Wash. State Bar Ass'n, Bd. of Governors' Revisions to Ethics 2003
Committee Recommendation 20-21 (July 2004), http://wsba.org/lawyers/groups/ethics2003/
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established, rule of legal ethics. Its roots can be traced to the 1969
American Bar Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility. 4
Prior to that point, lawyers "were encouraged, but not required, to report
other lawyers' misdeeds, and could keep silent about their peers' mis-conduct without fear of related punishment."3 5 As far back as 1887, the Alabama Code of Ethics stated, in aspirational terms, that "[a]ttorneys should
fearlessly expose before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest conduct
in the profession." 3 6 Of course, "should" is different from "shall."
A.

The Importance ofReporting

Today, many authorities describe the duty to report misconduct in a
manner suggesting that the obligation is essential to the ethical practice of
law. For example, law professor Nathan Crystal says that the duty is one
of the "central" aspects of professionalism.3 7 Douglas R. Richmond, a
legal ethics expert from the insurance field, likewise argues that the duty to
boardofgovernorsrevisionswithcomments.doc ("Among the most controversial issues addressed by the
[Washington State] Ethics 2003 Committee was the question of whether the duty to report
professional misconduct under Rule 8.3 ought to be mandatory or discretionary."); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i (2000) (summarizing
arguments for and against the rule and noting that "[slome lawyers have objected to the duty to
disclose another lawyer's wrongdoing"); Gerard E. Lynch, The Lawyer As Informer, 1986 DUKE L.J.
491, 492 (describing the mandatory reporting rule as "extraordinary"). The controversial nature of
the reporting obligation undoubtedly results in underreporting. Similar issues have arisen with
respect to the duty to report judicial misconduct. See David Pimentel, The Reluctant Tattletale:
Closing the Gap in FederalJudicialDiscipline,76 TENN. L. REV. 909, 927-36 (2009) (discussing why
judicial misconduct goes unreported).
34. See Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report ProfessionalMisconduct: A PracticalAnalysis
of Lawyer SelfRegulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 177-78 (1999) (reviewing the history of
"[The mandatory reporting Rule of the Code of Professional
the reporting rule).
Responsibility ... was deleted in a number of jurisdictions and was amended in others by
substituting the words 'should report' for 'shall report.'" 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.2, at 64-5 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
35. Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report ProfessionalMisconduct: A PracticalAnalysis of
Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 177 (1999).
36. CAROL RICE ANDREWS ET AL., GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS

GOODE JONES' 1887 CODE AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 117 (2003) (emphasis
added) (quoting Rule 11 of the Code of Ethics adopted by the Ala. State Bar Ass'n on December 14,
1887). The substance of the Alabama rule was carried forward into Canon 29 of the American Bar
Association's Canons of Professional Ethics (1908). Canon 29 provided in relevant part that
"[1]awyers should expose without fear or favor before the proper tribunals corrupt or dishonest
conduct in the profession." Id.
37. See Nathan M. Crystal, Professionalism and ReportingMisconduct of Other Lawyers, 20 S.C.
LAW., July 2008, at 8, 8 ("Professionalism has many aspects, but one of the central ideas is the duty
to report misconduct by other lawyers and judges .. . .
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report misconduct is "crucial" for at least three reasons. 3" First, lawyers
are often in the best position to recognize misconduct; second, the legal
profession has a duty to maintain high standards; and, third, absent a duty
to report misconduct, there is a risk that the profession's privilege of selfregulation would be lost.3 9 In part, Richmond's argument reflects the
idea, recognized cross-culturally, that "[t]he promise of ethical conduct is
one reason why governments grant a monopoly over legal services to legal
professions." 4 0 Richmond's argument also accepts as a given the need for
professional independence. 4 1 "An independent legal profession is an
important force in preserving government under law, for abuse of legal
authority is more readily challenged by a profession whose members are
not dependent on government for the right to practice."42
Nevertheless, questions can be raised about whether a duty to report
misconduct is a "fundamental" pillar of legal ethics, as some courts have
suggested. 4 3 By far, clients, former clients, and other nonlawyers file more
Even absent reporting by lawyers, there
grievances than do lawyers. 4
would be an almost endless supply of grist for the disciplinary mill.
Lawyers could still devote, with great purpose and effect, a huge amount of
time to sorting out allegations of misconduct as members of grievance
committees or as disciplinary special prosecutors.1 5 Indeed, whatever time
lawyers now spend policing the ranks of the profession is devoted largely to
38. Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report ProfessionalMisconduct: A PracticalAnalysis of
Lauyer SelfRegulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 175 (1999).
39. Id. at 175-76.
40. Andrew Boon, Legal Ethics, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND

GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 503 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
41. Douglas R. Richmond, The Duty to Report ProfessionalMisconduct: A PracticalAnalysis of
Lawyer Self-Regulation, 12 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 175, 175 (1999).
42. OHIO

RULES

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

pmbl.

1

11

(2011),

available

at

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConductRules.pdf.
43. See In re Ethics Advisory Panel Op. No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 318-19 (R.I. 1993)
(characterizing the duty to report as a "fundamental ethical obligation[] of [lawyers] engaged in the
practice of law"); see also Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Informal Op. 001
(2007), available at 2007 WL 1232241 (describing the duty to report misconduct as a "solemn
responsibility of the legal profession").
44. See Tim Strauch, Busy Beginningfor Discipline Counsel, 28 MONT. LAW., Apr. 2003, at 10,
10 (stating that in Montana, during calendar year 2002, "[c]lients or ex-clients filed about 75 percent
of all complaints. Opposing counsel filed about 8 percent, while opposing parties filed about 7
percent. Third parties or other non-categorized complainants made up the remaining 10 percent").
45. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 3.2, at 85 (Practitioner's ed.
1986) (discussing volunteer lawyers investigating and prosecuting misconduct).
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the resolution of charges initiated by nonlawyers.
Moreover, while lawyers may be best able to spot certain types of
misconduct, particularly ethics violations of a technical variety such as
impermissible conflicts of interest, it seems likely that clients have no
trouble identifying the most common bases for discipline such as neglect,
abusive fee arrangements, and mishandling of funds and property.4
Clients are now far better informed than at any point in the past about
their right to file a grievance and, to that extent, are more likely to do so.
Information about resolving disputes with lawyers is readily available on
the Internet,4 7 and, in some states, clients are squarely advised about their
rights. For example, in Texas, lawyers have a statutory obligation to
disclose the availability of a grievance process to clients via brochures or
signs posted in the lawyer's place of business, or by including language in
the lawyer-client contract or in bills for legal services."
Doubts about the importance of the mandatory reporting rule are also
raised by broad exceptions to the duty, discussed below, and by the
uncertain contours of the reporting obligation. As Professor Crystal has
asserted-in terms which many law students studying the rule would likely
agree-"the precise scope of [the duty to report] is remarkably vague." 4 9
Finally, even before 1969, when mandatory reporting requirements were
first promulgated, lawyers played an important role in professional selfregulation. 5 0 Presumably, the same is true today in California, Georgia,

46. See Justice Edward Kinkeade, The Top Ten Reasons Clients File Grievances Against Their
Lawyers, 5 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 35, 35-38 (1998) (listing neglect, termination-related errors,
and mishandling of client funds as the top three reasons); Attorney Discipline 101, 70 TEX. B.J. 866,
867 (2007) (indicating, in Texas, during 2006-2007 the "most common allegations were neglect,
failure to communicate, and complaints about the termination or withdrawal of representation").
47. For example, on the first page of the Texas State Bar website, in the first frame, under a
heading that states "For the Public," there is a starred link that reads: "Complaints against a lawyer?
Get information on the process." STATE BAR OF TEX., http://www.texasbar.com (last visited May 9,
2011).
48. TEx. GovT. CODE ANN. § 81.079(b) (West 2010).
49. Nathan M. Crystal, Professionalism and Reporting Misconduct of Other Lawyers, 20 S.C.
LAW., July 2008, at 8, 8; see also Nikki A. Ott & Heather F. Newton, A CurrentLook at Model Rule
8.3: How Is It Used and What Are Courts DoingAbout It?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 747, 750 (2003)
(describing the reporting rule as "rife with vague standards").
50. See generally Michael S. Ariens, American Legal Ethics in an Age ofAnxiety, 40 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 343 (2008) (recounting in detail the history of American legal ethics from the early nineteenth
century to early twenty-first century).
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and Washington where, as noted, reporting is not mandatory.5 1
However, even if requiring lawyers to report misconduct is not a sine
qua non 5 2 of professionalism, it is certainly consistent with the pursuit of
high ethical standards. When retired United States Supreme Court Justice
Tom C. Clark headed the American Bar Association committee, 5 3 whose
report ultimately proved pivotal to the reform of lawyer disciplinary
systems nationwide, 5 the Clark Committee identified the reluctance of
lawyers to report misconduct as a serious deficiency 5 5 that contributed to a
"scandalous" state of affairs in the field of lawyer self-regulation. 5 Not
only did the Clark Report call for sanctions to be imposed "in appropriate
circumstances[] against attorneys and judges who fail to report attorney
misconduct," 5 7 but Justice Clark personally led by example. "While
chairing the ABA Special Committee, Justice Clark received a complaint
from a layperson about an attorney who allegedly acted unethically in
connection with the settlement of a case and disbursement of funds.""
Within eight days that letter was "forwarded to the appropriate local
grievance committee '[o] n behalf of Justice Clark.'" 5 9
Yet even when the importance of lawyer reporting of professional misconduct is acknowledged, it is clear that the current version of the relevant
disciplinary rule usually imposes a duty to report only in a narrow range of
cases. The contours of the obligations imposed by the rule are discussed
below.
51. See supra PartI (detailing the respective lack of a reporting requirement).
52. "An indispensable condition or thing; something on which something else necessarily
depends." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1511 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "sine qua non").
53. See generally MIMI CLARK GRONLUND, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE TOM C. CLARK: A
LIFE OF SERVICE 249-52 (2009) (discussing the Clark Committee), reviewed by Vincent R. Johnson,
Book Review, 56 FED. LAW., Dec. 2009, at 76.
54. See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C Clark's Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J.
LEGAL PROF. 33, 39 (2005) (describing how Justice Clark's efforts catalyzed more than three decades
of reform in the area of lawyer professional responsibility).
55. See ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT,
PROBLEMS & RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 167 (Final Draft 1970)
(hereinafter "Clark Report") (recommending "[g]reater emphasis in ... continuing legal education
courses on the individual attorney's responsibility to assist the profession's efforts to police itself by
reporting instances of professional misconduct").
56. Id. at 1.
57. Id at 167.
58. See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C Clark's Legacy in the Field of Legal Ethics, 29 J.
LEGAL PROF. 33, 58-59 (2005).
59. Id at 59 & n.165 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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The Knowledge Requirement

The first significant limitation on the duty to report lawyer misconduct
is the knowledge requirement. A duty is triggered by the facts of a case
only when a lawyer "knows" of a serious violation of the ethics rules. 6 0
According to the terminology section of the Model Rules, the word
"'knows' denotes actual knowledge," and "[a] person's knowledge may be
inferred from [the] circumstances." 6 1 However, the import of this
definition is far from clear. Presumably, "actual knowledge" must be
distinguished from "constructive knowledge." 6 2 Even if that is so, it is
also true that courts, ethics committees, and commentators have struggled
with the meaning of the knowledge requirement as it relates to mandatory
reporting. One court found that the range of theoretical possibilities
stretched "'any information,' [on the one hand,] to [the type of] 'personal
knowledge' sufficient to qualify one as a witness under ... rules of
evidence," on the other hand.6
1. Mere Possibility
All authorities agree that "knowledge" entails more than a hunch, a
feeling, 6 4 or a suspicion. 6 5 They also agree that absolute certainty is not
However, something approaching certainty seems to be
required.
essential. 6 6 There must be, at a minimum, "objective facts that are likely
60. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010).

61. Id. R. 1.0(f.
62. Black's Law Dictionary explains that "actual knowledge" means "[d]irect and clear
knowledge, as distinguished from constructive knowledge <the employer, having witnessed the
accident, had actual knowledge of the worker's injury>." BIACK'S IAW DICTIONARY 950 (9th ed.
2009). "Constructive knowledge" is defined as: "Knowledge that one using reasonable care or
diligence should have, and therefore that is attributed by law to a given person <the court held that
the partners had constructive knowledge of the partnership agreement even though none of them had
read it>." Id.
63. Att'y U v. Miss. Bar, 678 So. 2d 963, 964 (Miss. 1996).
64. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Informal Op. 13 (2004), available at 2004
WL 3413897 ("Sometimes one has a visceral reaction to conduct that produces a 'feeling' that the
conduct ought to be reported. That is a reasonable starting point for sorting things out. But it is not
enough.").
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE IAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i (2000)
("Knowledge is assessed on an objective standard. It includes more than a suspicion that misconduct
has occurred, and mere suspicion does not impose a duty of inquiry."); see also S.C. Bar Ethics
Advisory Comm., Op. 04 (2005), availableat 2005 WL 483384 (opining that a mere "suspicion of
double-billing, without other corroborating evidence, does not constitute knowledge").
66. Cf SUSAN SAAB FORTNEY & VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE IAW:
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to have evidentiary support."6 7 However, a mere possibility, or even a
likelihood, that a violation occurred falls short of establishing "knowledge."
The fact that another lawyer "probably committed malpractice" is too
uncertain to create a duty to report.6 8
In discussing "knowledge" in the context of the duty to disclose fraud to
an opposing party, an ethics committee in Philadelphia wrote: "Although
the inquirer is in possession of an expert witness opinion that it is 'likely'
that fraud of some type has been committed, the Committee doubts that
an opinion from a non-lawyer expert that fraud is 'likely' rises to the level
of 'actual knowledge' that the Rule requires. "69 Then, turning to the
related duty to report misconduct to disciplinary authorities, the
committee further opined that, in light of the demands of the "knowledge"
requirement, "any uncertainty as to whether there has been fraud,
compounded with the inquirer's assessment that it is only 'possible' that
opposing counsel either purposefully or negligently failed to report that
fraud, relieves the inquirer of any obligation to inform the Disciplinary
Board." 7 0
Similarly, an ethics committee in South Carolina illustrated the strict
conditions of the knowledge requirement while discussing whether a
lawyer (Jane) had a duty to report suspected double-billing by another
lawyer (John) who did unrelated work while attending a deposition. 7 1
The committee wrote:
[E]ven if Attorney John made the statement about billing 15 hours in one
day, Attorney Jane would still have no actual knowledge of a violation, and
therefore, would not be required to report. Attorney Jane has no "firm
knowledge" of Attorney John's schedule, or whether his statement reflects
PROBLEMS AND PREVENTION 122 (2007) (stating that "'[kinowledge' in the law of torts means a

state of mind indicating that a result is 'substantially certain' to occur" and discussing how knowledge
can be proven circumstantially); VINCENT R. JOHNSON & ALAN GUNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN
TORT LAW 41 (4th ed. 2009) (emphasizing that knowledge requires "substantial certainty" and that

"[w]hile substantial certainty does not mean absolute certainty, it means certainty for all practical
purposes").

See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL

HARM §1 (2010) (discussing knowledge).
67. Tex. Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 520, 60 TEX. B.J. 490 (1997).
68. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 08 (1997), availableat 1997 WL
103495.
69. Phila. Bar Ass'n Profl Guidance Comm., Op. 07 (2005), availableat 2005 WL 5544951.
70. Id
71. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04 (2005), availableat 2005 WL 483384.
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anticipated time to be spent during the evening or already spent on early
morning work.n
Likewise, an Illinois ethics committee found that there was no duty to
report a lawyer's failure to segregate or pay over funds belonging to a third
person. 7 3 It reasoned: "Although keeping the money after its ownership
has clearly been established may raise a strong suspicion of the intent to
permanently deprive, these facts [are] insufficient to establish knowledge of
lawyer theft." 7 4
An ethics committee in Philadelphia addressed the issue of whether
lawyers handling a legal malpractice case had a duty to report misconduct
by the malpractice defendant related to the improper execution of a client's
name on documents. 7 5 It wrote:
It is important that Rule 8.3(a) addresses actual knowledge of misconduct
and not suspect[ed] misconduct. As such, since you do not have any actual
knowledge that any attorney at the defendant law firm had any knowledge of
its employees' conduct with respect to the signing and notarization of the
Release and Trust Agreement, you are not required ... to report these facts
to the Disciplinary Board.7 6
2.

Second-Hand Information

"Second-hand" knowledge is unlikely to trigger a duty to report. Thus,
an Illinois ethics committee opined that "the obligation to report
misconduct under Rules 8.3 and 8.4 would not likely be triggered by
reports [of lawyer misconduct] read in a newspaper." 7 7
In Virginia, the reporting rule is triggered by a lawyer having "reliable
information" rather than "knowledge." 7 8 Presumably, in that state, some
second-hand information might be deemed reliable, and other secondhand information not reliable.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Il. Jud. Ethics Comm., Op. 01-04 (2002), availableat 2002 WL 127195.
Id.
Phil. Bar Ass'n Prof'l Guidance Comm., Op. 03 (1997), availableat 1997 WL 428087.
Id. (citations omitted).
Ill. State Bar Ass'n., Op. 91-19 (1992), availableat 1992 WL 754617.
VA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R, 8.3(a) (West 2010).
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Substantial Certainty or Firm Opinion

Although there are illustrations to the contrary, 7 9 bar association ethics
committees have often articulated the knowledge requirement in
demanding terms, stating that what is required is: a "substantial degree of
certainty,"8 o "substantial basis," 8 1 "facts that clearly establish," 8 2 "clear
belief,"8 3 or "firm knowledge." 8 4
This is not surprising because, as
various writers have noted, "accusing another lawyer of misconduct is a
serious matter that should not be undertaken lightly."" 5 Reflecting the
gravity of charging another lawyer with wrongdoing, a Connecticut ethics
opinion cautioned:
[O]ne should be clear about what one "knows." .

. .

[O]ne should (a) take

Rule 1.6 [(client confidentialit)y] into account; (b) have a clear
understanding of the specific conduct in question, including giving
consideration to the available evidence; (c) identify other applicable rules; (d)
be able to articulate how the conduct violates the rules; and then (e) decide
whether the conduct raises a substantial question as to the lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness or fitness to practice law in other respects .

. .

. The goal is

79. For example, a North Carolina ethics opinion appears to have endorsed a "reasonably
believes" standard. See N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 2 (2009), available at 2009 WL 1425513 ("If,
after communicating with John Doe, buyer/borrower's counsel reasonably believes that John Doe is
knowingly assisting the title company in the unauthorized practice of law, and plans to continue
participating in such conduct, buyer/borrower's counsel must report John Doe to the State Bar.").
However, an earlier decision of the same committee spoke in more demanding terms. See N.C. State
Bar, Formal Op. 2 (2003), availableat 2003 WL 24306941 (stating that "reporting to the State Bar
is not required unless a lawyer has knowledge of an actual violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct"); see also Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 33 (1997), available at
1997 WL 816054 (opining that "if on the basis of the facts.... coupled with your experience, it is
reasonable for you to infer, and you do infer, that plaintiffs lawyer has engaged in conduct which
violates the Rules . . . , then you have knowledge"); La. State Bar Ass'n Rules of Prof[ Conduct
Comm., Op. 010 (2006), available at http://www.lsba.org/DocumentIndex/EthicOpinions/06OORPCCPublication.pdf (stating that the "knowledge" requirement is satisfied if "a reasonable
lawyer could infer that improper behavior more than likely occurred").
80. Me. Profl Ethics Comm'n, Op. 100 (1989), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/
whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar overseers -ethics opinions&id=91501 &v=artide.
81. N.M. Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 08 (1988), availableat http://www.nmbar.org/
legalresearch/eao/988/1988-8.doc.
82. N.Y.C. Ass'n of the Bar Comm. on Profl & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 03 (1990), available
at http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/eth 1990-3.htm.
83. D.C. Bar, Op. 246 (1994), available at http://www.dcbar.org/for-lawyers/ethics/legal
ethics/opinions/opinion246.cfm; see also S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 13 (2002), available
at 2002 WL 31452387 (stating that the South Carolina reporting rule "requires actual knowledge of,
or believing dearly that there has been a violation").
84. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04 (2005), availableat 2005 WL 483384.
85. Id. (citing S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 13 (2002)).
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to reach an objective, independent judgment consistent with one's
obligations to one's client. 8 6
A Pennsylvania ethics opinion took a similarly demanding position. In
determining whether there is a duty to report, it advised a lawyer that
"[k]nowledge may be inferred from circumstances[; however,] you must
point to a specific Rule that you believe has been violated."" 7 The
committee opined that on the given facts the lawyer had no obligation to
report a suspected conflict of interest." The committee wrote:
After consultation with his clients, both consented to the attorney's double
representation. To report a violation now you should have reliable
information to show that the lawyer's double representation will adversely
affect his relationship with one or both of his clients.
From our neutral position you appear to have a high and probably an
unsustainable burden. 8 9
In Maine, a lawyer representing a client in a legal malpractice case
requested an ethics opinion because his client strongly contended that at
least one of three documents executed by his former lawyer was
fraudulently prepared.9 0 Because the client's new lawyer did "not share
his client's conviction" that the malpractice defendant was guilty of fraud,
the committee found that the lawyer lacked "knowledge" and therefore
had no obligation to report misconduct. 9 '
a.

Undisputed Documentary Evidence

In some cases, a lawyer's knowledge of undisputed documentary
evidence may provide a basis for concluding that the lawyer knew with
substantial certainty, or must have had a firm opinion, that another lawyer

86. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 13 (2004), availableat 2004 WL
3413897 (last alteration in original) (footnote & citation omitted); see also N.Y.C. Ass'n of the Bar
Comm. on Profl & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 03 (1990), available at http://www.abcny.org/
Ethics/ethl990-3.htm (indicating that "a lawyer must be in possession of facts that clearly establish a
violation of one or more Disciplinary Rules by another lawyer before an obligation (to report]
arises").
87. Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 40 (1997),
availableat 1997 WL 816643.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Me. Profl Ethics Comm'n, Op. 100 (1989), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/
whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebar.overseers..ethics-opinions&id=91501 &v=artide.
91. Id.
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violated applicable disciplinary rules. Presumably, this would be true
where documents show that a lawyer entered into an agreement under
which the amount of the lawyer's fee was contingent on the sum of
alimony awarded in a divorce9 2 or which gave the lawyer sole authority to
accept or reject settlement offers.9 3
Similarly, suppose that replacement counsel discovers that predecessor
counsel falsified answers to interrogatories, and then amends the answers,
but does not report the initial lawyer's misconduct to disciplinary
authorities. The relevant documentary evidence would appear to prove
indisputably that the lawyer knew of predecessor counsel's serious
misconduct."
b.

Uncontroverted Versus Disputed Evidence

If the evidence of a lawyer's misconduct is clear and uncontroverted, or
acknowledged by the lawyer in question, 9 5 as by the signing of an affidavit
verifying the receipt of a previously undisclosed improper finder's fee, 9" it
is easier to conclude that an expert with knowledge of that evidence has a
duty to report the information to disciplinary authorities. In contrast, if
the evidence of misconduct is circumstantial, uncorroborated, 9 7 or
contested, it is less likely that the expert has the firm belief that is a
92. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2010) ("A lawyer shall not enter into
an arrangement for, charge, or collect .. . any fee in a domestic relations matter, the payment or
amount of which is contingent upon the securing of a divorce or upon the amount of alimony or
support, or property settlement in lieu thereof. . . .").
93. See id. 1.2(a) ("A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision whether to settle a matter."); id.
R. 1.4 cmt. 2 (providing that, with limited exceptions, "a lawyer who receives from opposing counsel
an offer of settlement in a civil controversy ... must promptly inform the client of its substance").
"Rule 1.2(a) protects each client's right to have the final say in deciding whether to accept or reject an
offer of settlement . . . ." Id. R. 1.8 cmt. 13.
94. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
5 64.5, illus. 64-2, at 64-16 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (opining, on similar facts, that "Lawyer B obviously
knew of Lawyer A's violation, because he was the one who discovered it").
95. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04 (2005), available at 2005 WL 483384
(expressing the view that an earlier ethics opinion of the same committee correctly held that where
the offending lawyer acknowledged contacting a represented person, in violation of applicable ethics
rules, there was a duty to report the misconduct).
96. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 173
(1995), availableat 1996 WL 928112 (involving such an affidavit).
97. Cf S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04 (2005), available at 2005 WL 483384
(indicating that uncorroborated suspicion of double-billing did not constitute knowledge of
misconduct, even though the lawyer in question observed another lawyer doing unrelated work
during a deposition and filling in a time sheet).
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necessary predicate for reporting to be mandatory.
In Attorney U v. Mississippi Bar,9 8 the Supreme Court of Mississippi
concluded that there was no duty to report misconduct on the facts of the
case. 9 9 The court reasoned as follows:
The circumstances under consideration here reflect that U's client told him
of an arrangement which appeared to be fee splitting. The record tells us
nothing concerning corroboration of the client's story or of the client's
trustworthiness. The other party to the purported arrangement denies that it
existed. These circumstances do not dictate a firm opinion on the part of a
reasonable lawyer that the conduct in fact occurred. 0 0
c.

Objective Versus Subjective Standard

The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers provides that
"[k]nowledge is assessed on an objective standard."' 0 1 According to the
Restatement commentary, "[k]nowledge exists in an instance in which a
reasonable lawyer in the circumstances would have a firm opinion that the
conduct in question more likely than not occurred." 10 2
The
circumstances may be such that, despite the lawyer's protestations to the

contrary, "a disciplinary authority will infer that [a] lawyer must have
known."'o 3
Various courts have embraced the "firm opinion"
standard.' 0o
For example, in In re Riehlmann,' 0 5 the Supreme Court of Louisiana
summarized the law as follows:
[I]t is clear that absolute certainty of ethical misconduct is not required
before the reporting requirement is triggered. The lawyer is not required to
conduct an investigation and make a definitive decision that a violation has

98. Att'y U v. Miss. Bar, 678 So. 2d 963 (Miss. 1996).

99. Id. at 972.
10 0. Id.
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i (2000); see also
ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 433 (2004) ("Most cases and ethics
opinions conclude that 'knowledge' is determined by an objective standard.").
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i (2000).
103. See 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF IAWYERING
§ 402, Intro. at 26 (2d ed. Supp. 1998).
104. See Arty U, 678 So. 2d at 972 (holding that a lawyer did not have before him evidence
that would have caused a reasonable lawyer to form a firm opinion that another lawyer had entered
into an improper fee agreement, and therefore there was no violation of the reporting rule).
105. In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239 (La. 2005).
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occurred before reporting; that responsibility belongs to the disciplinary
system and this court .... [R]eporting is required, where the supporting
evidence is such that a reasonable lawyer under the circumstances would
form a firm belief that the conduct in question had more likely than not
occurred.06

The Restatement and cases like In re Riehlmann are correct in
emphasizing the importance of objective evidence in determining what the
reporting attorney knew. The fact that a reasonable lawyer would have
known that there was serious misconduct provides a basis for concluding
that the lawyer in question must have known of the misconduct.
However, viewed from the perspective of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and similar state provisions, Riehlmann was wrong in
stating that "knowledge is measured by an objective standard that is not
tied to the subjective beliefs of the lawyer in question."o107 The language
in the Model Rules, and similar standards, requires "knowledge," which is
defined as "actual knowledge." 1 o The Model Rules do not purport to
impose a reporting duty on a lawyer who merely should have known that
another lawyer engaged in serious misconduct. The relevant inquiry is
ultimately subjective, not objective. The question is what the lawyer who
failed to make the report knew, not what some hypothetical, reasonably
prudent, lawyer would have known or should have known.
In some cases, it will make a difference whether the standard is framed
subjectively, rather than objectively. For example, even if there is
documentary evidence of another lawyer's serious violation of applicable
disciplinary rules, there is a duty to report that misconduct only if the
lawyer in question realizes what the evidence means. A lawyer who can
convince a disciplinary tribunal that he or she never read the documentary
evidence, or never appreciated that its terms550 were unethical, should not
be found to have violated a reporting standard that requires actual
knowledge.
The relevance of objective evidence to the subjective inquiry into actual
knowledge is sometimes framed in terms of whether a lawyer pursued a

106. Id. at 1247.
107. Id
108. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2010) (defining knowledge); id
R. 8.3(a) (referring to Rule 1.0).
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course of deliberate ignorance. For example, an American Bar Association
ethics committee touched on the issue of objectivity in an opinion stating
that "[a] lawyer who believes that another lawyer's mental condition
materially impairs her ability to represent clients, and who knows that that
lawyer continues to do so, must report that lawyer's consequent violation
of Rule 1.16(b)(2), which requires that she withdraw from the
representation of clients." 1 0 9 Addressing the issue of whether a lawyer has
knowledge of such misconduct, the committee explained that even though
lawyers are not mental health professionals, "a lawyer may not shut his eyes
to conduct reflecting generally recognized symptoms of impairment."'1o
In a related vein, a New York City ethics committee noted that "[s]tudious
ignorance of readily accessible facts is . . . the functional equivalent of

knowledge."' n
C.

"Honesty, Trustworthiness, or Fitness"

There is only a duty to report misconduct that is sufficiently serious that
the "profession must vigorously endeavor to prevent" it.112 Thus, the
relevant Model Rule says that there must be a "substantial question as to
that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects."" 13 According to the official comment, the Model Rule uses the
term "substantial" to refer to "the seriousness of the possible offense and
Numerous
not the quantum of evidence of which the lawyer is aware.""
state ethics codes contain similar language. Moreover, as explained by a
Philadelphia ethics committee, in language which the Model Rules use," 15
"[t]he term 'substantial' denotes a material matter of clear and weighty
importance.
According to an American Bar Association ethics opinion, "It generally
is agreed that reporting under .. . [Model Rule 8.3] is required only when

109. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 431 (2003).
110. Id.
111. N.Y.C. Ass'n of the Bar Comm. on Profl & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 003 (1990),
availableat http://www.abcny.org/Ethics/ethl990-3.htm.
112. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (2010).
113. Id. R. 8.3.
114. Id. R. 8.3 cmt. 3.
115. See, e.g., id. R. 1.0(1) (defining "substantial").
116. Phila. Bar Ass'n Profl Guidance Comm., Op. 07 (2005), availableat 2005 WL 5544951.
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the conduct in question is egregious."117 However, a South Carolina

ethics committee applied a looser standard, suggesting that actions
indicating disloyalty were "substantial because [that] conduct constitutes
more than a mere technical violation of the Rules of Professional
Conduct."' 18
1. Raising a "Substantial Question"
"A 'substantial' violation of the rules alone is not enough [to make
reporting mandatory]; the violation must be of such a nature that the
conduct raises a 'substantial' question about the fitness of the offending
lawyer to carry out his professional role."1'
Thus, a lawyer may have no duty to make a report to disciplinary
authorities either because another lawyer's act or omission does not
amount to misconduct1 2 0 or because, though constituting misconduct, it
does not raise a substantial question about honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness. For example, an ethics committee in North Carolina was asked to
address whether there was a duty to report that a lawyer had submitted to a
court a brief that "contained eight pages, verbatim, from an appellate brief
previously drafted and filed" by another lawyer in a different firm in an
unrelated case.121
The committee opined that reporting was not
necessary, reasoning that, because "[u]lpon filing with a court, a brief enters
the public domain," there was no misconduct.1 2 2 The committee did not
need to reach the question of whether the alleged misconduct was
sufficiently serious that notification of disciplinary authorities was
mandated. Presumably, if the committee had found the use of the
unattributed material constituted misconduct, the infraction would have

117. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 453 (2008) (emphasis
added).
118. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 15 (2002), available at 2002 WL 31717779
(emphasis added).
119. Conn. Bar Ass'n. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 04 (2001), availableat 2001 WL
694583 (quoting 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILuAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 8.3:201, at 945 (2d ed. Supp. 1996)).
120. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & ProfI Responsibility, Formal Op. 429 (2003) ("No
obligation to report exists under Rule 8.3(a) if the impairment [of a lawyer who left the firm] has not
resulted in a violation of the Model Rules.").
121. N.C. State Bar, Formal Op. 14 (2008), availableat 2009 WL 435074.
122. Id.
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reflected on the user's honesty, and there would have been a duty to report
the misconduct.
An Ohio ethics opinion took the position that "[i]f a lawyer has doubts
as to whether misconduct raises questions as to honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer, he or she should err on the side of reporting." 1 2 3
However, the same opinion also said that "[a] mere suspicion of
misconduct need not be reported. Actual knowledge is the standard."' 2 4
Thus, the opinion seems to endorse the idea that, in determining whether
there is a duty to report, doubts about whether an ethics rule was violated
are more significant than doubts about what the violation says regarding
the alleged violator's character and fitness.
For the purpose of emphasizing that only important varieties of
misconduct need to be reported, Michigan has inserted the word
"significant" before "violation" in its reporting rule.1 2 5 Thus, the rule
provides that there is a duty to report only if "another lawyer has
committed a significantviolation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that
raises a substantialquestion as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or

fitness."1 2 6
In contrast, Kansas has potentially broadened the reporting obligationor perhaps made reporting simply a matter of personal discretion-by
dispensing with the usual "misconduct" and the "substantial question"
requirements. 2 7 The Kansas rule states: "A lawyer having knowledge of
any action, inaction, or conduct[,] which in his or her opinion constitutes
misconduct of an attorney under these rules[,] shall inform the appropriate
professional authority."12 8
a.

Examples

The Ohio ethics opinion mentioned above declined to list all of the
types of misconduct that would serve as the predicate for a duty to report.
Rather, the opinion simply noted that "[a] review of disciplinary cases will
123.
2007 WL
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Informal Op. 001 (2007), availableat
1232241.
Id.
MICH. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010).
Id. (emphasis added).
KAN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010).
Id. (emphasis added).
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provide ample guidance as to the types of misconduct that raise a question
as to a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer to the level
of reporting."1 2 9 Presumably, that category includes such things as misuse
of client funds or property,13 0 misconduct that resulted in significant
harm to a client,' 3 ' serious criminal' 3 2 or fraudulent 3 3 conduct, and
improper manipulation of legal processes. The last-named subcategory
would likely include knowingly filing a backdated motion; 1 3 4 falsely

129. Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Informal Op. 001 (2007), availableat
2007 WL 1232241.
130. Cf 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING

§ 64.3,

at 64-6 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (opining that "self-dealing with trust funds" would require
reporting); id. § 64.8, at 64-20 (indicating that "misappropriation of a client's funds . . . is obviously
a serious violation" of professional standards).
131. Cf FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3-5.1(b)(1)(B) (2010) (stating that, in the
context of disciplinary sanctions, conduct is not minor if "the misconduct resulted in or is likely to
result in actual prejudice (loss of money, legal rights, or valuable property rights) to a client or other
person").
132. See MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3 (2010) (addressing this point in
detail). A comment to the Massachusetts reporting rule provides:
[A] lawyer must report misconduct that, if proven and without regard to mitigation, would
likely result in an order of suspension or disbarment, including misconduct that would
constitute a "serious crime" as defined in S.J.C. Rule 4:01, § 12(3). Precedent for determining
whether an offense would warrant suspension or disbarment may be found in the Massachusetts
Attorney Discipline Reports. Section 12(3) of Rule 4:01 provides that a serious crime is "any
felony, and ... any lesser crime a necessary element of which ... includes interference with the
administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file income
tax returns, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy, or
solicitation of another to commit [such a crime]." In addition to a conviction of a felony,
misappropriation of client funds or perjury before a tribunal are common examples of reportable
conduct.
Id. (alterations in original); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 433
(2004) (opining that "[e]ven criminal conduct that is arguably minor or personal may be found to"
adversely reflect on a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness (internal quotation marks omitted));
cf N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.15-2(o) (2010) ("A lawyer who discovers or reasonably
believes that entrusted property has been misappropriated or misapplied shall promptly inform the
North Carolina State Bar.").
133. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 20 (1996), available at 1996
WL 785137 (finding that an associate had a duty to report another associate's fraudulent alteration of
billing statements); 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 64.4, at 64-11 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (indicating this would be true even if the criminal or fraudulent
conduct is unrelated to provision of legal services, as in the case of personal tax fraud or illegal
securities transactions).
134. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 04 (2001), available at 2001
WL 694583 (asserting that a lawyer with knowledge of such a violation has a duty to report that
misconduct).
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witnessing a deed, either personally1 3 5 or by ordering or ratifying the
conduct of another;' 3 6 improperly redacting a medical report to conceal
unfavorable information;1 3 7 destroying evidence under subpoena;' 3 s
bribing witnesses;' 3 9 and suborning perjury.' 4 0
However, the duty to report is not limited to such clear instances of
wrongdoing. Illustratively, courts or committees have determined that
there was a duty to report such diverse infractions as assisting a client to
file a pro se pleading in a jurisdiction where the lawyer was not
licensed, 4 ' disclosure of the terms of a confidential settlement
A South Carolina
agreement,142 and misuse of client information.
ethics committee found that "neglect of a client matter may be sufficient to
raise a substantial question as to fitness, even though the neglect [does] not
result in any actionable injury to the client."' 4 4
135. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 30 (1997), available at 1997
WL 816051 (1997) (stating there is a duty to report misconduct by a lawyer who executes an
acknowledgment on a deed even though he is not present at the signing or by using his wife's name).
136. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 10 (1998), availableat 1998
WL 993680 (opining that there is a duty to report misconduct by a lawyer who supervises a
nonlawyer assistant's false signing of a deed).
137. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 33 (1997), availableat 1997
WL 816054 (requiring disclosure).
138. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE IAW OF LAWYERING § 64.3,
at 64-6 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
139. See N.M. Ethics Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 8 (1988), available at
http://www.nmbar.org/legalresearch/eao/1988/1988-8.doc (concluding "that knowledge of an
attempt by an attorney to influence testimony of witnesses in a legal proceeding, including an
arbitration proceeding, by offer of monetary reward, meets the seriousness requirement" of the
reporting rule).
140. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAzARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.3,
at 64-6 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
141. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Prof'l Responsibility, Informal Op. 11
(2002), available at 2002 WL 32078007 (finding that the conduct violated Pennsylvania Rule of
Professional Conduct 5.5, which prohibits a lawyer from aiding a nonlawyer in the unauthorized
practice of law).
142. See S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 15 (2002), availableat 2002 WL 31717779
(suggesting that the disclosure violated state ethics rules 8.4(d), "conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation," and 8. 4 (e), "conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice").
143. See id. (finding a violation ofstate ethics Rules 1.6 (addressing confidentiality) and 1.8(b),
(dealing with use of information to the disadvantage of a client)).
144. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 13 (2002), available at 2002 WL 31452387
(finding that if "Attorney A has knowledge that Attorney B has violated Rules 1.1 [(competence)]
and 1.16 (a)(2) [(duty to withdraw)] due to a medical condition materially impairing the attorney's
ability to represent a client or clients, and the violations raise a substantial question as to Attorney B's
fitness as a lawyer, Attorney A shall inform the appropriate professional authority").
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Narrower and Broader Rules

A few states have adopted a narrow definition of the kinds of
misconduct that must be reported. For example, in Illinois, lawyers are
required to "report other lawyers only for specific types of misconduct,
[that is,] certain crimes, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation." 1 4 5 An
ethics committee found that this provision meant there was no duty to
report the failure of a lawyer to segregate or pay over a referral fee that
belonged to a bar association. 1 4 6
Louisiana has omitted the word "substantial" from its rule, which
provides that there is an obligation to report misconduct that simply "raises
a question as to the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness." 1 4 7 By
deleting the word "substantial," the Louisiana rule imposes a "more
expansive" reporting obligation than Model Rule 8.3.14s
2.

One-Time Transgressions

Whether a one-time transgression needs to be reported depends on the
severity of the infraction. Presumably, the issuance of a single erroneous
billing statement need not be reported, provided that the amount of the
discrepancy is modest. In contrast, consistent overbilling of a client "is
serious enough to call into question [a lawyer's] honesty, trustworthiness,
and fitness," and therefore needs to be reported.14 9
An ethics committee in Texas reasoned that it is not necessary to report
to disciplinary authorities a single instance in which another lawyer in the
same firm gave a client clearly negligent advice, because a "mistake or
isolated incident of negligent legal services" did not raise a substantial

145. Ill. Jud. Ethics Comm., Op. 01-04 (2002), availableat 2002 WL 127195. The Illinois
reporting rule states that "[a] lawyer who knows that another lawyer has committed a violation of
Rule 8.4(b) [("a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects")] or Rule 8.4(c) [("conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation")] shall inform the appropriate professional authority." ILL. RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010).
146. Ill. Jud. Ethics Comm., Op. 0 1-04 (2002), availableat 2002 WL 127195.
147. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
148. La. State Bar Ass'n Rules of Profl Conduct Comm., Op. 010 (2006), availableat
http://www.1sba.org/Documentlndex/EthicOpinions/06-0 1ORPCCPublication.pdf.
149. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.7
illus. 64-3, at 64-18 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
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question about the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness.1 50
Other authorities have reached similar conclusions.' 5 ' However, an
ethics committee in South Carolina, considering issues related to improper
contact with a represented person,1 5 2 concluded that "[e]ven a one-time
violation must be reported if it falls under the guidelines" of the reporting
rule.15 3
The commentary to Model Rule 8.3 states: "An apparently isolated
violation may indicate a pattern of misconduct that only a disciplinary
investigation can uncover."' 5 ' This suggests that a one-time transgression
needs to be reported. However, an ethics committee in Connecticut,
addressing identical language in that state's code, downplayed its
significance.' 5 5 The committee wrote that "if the occurrence of 'an
apparently isolated violation' were the standard for triggering a duty to
report, lawyers would become full-time informers." 156
3.

"As a Lawyer"

Not everything done in a lawyer's private life implicates his or her fitness
as a lawyer. This point was recognized by a Connecticut ethics committee
that was asked to address whether there was a duty to report possible
perjury by a lawyer in his divorce proceeding, which was later recanted by
the lawyer at his second deposition. The committee wrote:
[T]he facts we have been asked to assume, which include correcting the
record, do not by themselves raise a substantial question about the Deponent150. Tex. Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 523, 60 TEX. B.J. 971 (1997).
151. See SUSAN . MARTYN & LAWRENCE J. FOX, TRAVERSING THE ETHICAL MINEFIELD:
PROBLEMS, LAW, AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 51 (2d ed. 2008) ("Less serious matters,

such as a single act of incompetence or conflicts of interest that do not cause harm, have been found
not to trigger the reporting requirement."); 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES,
THE LAW OF LAwYERING § 64.4, at 64-10 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (suggesting that missing a filing date
on one occasion would not likely raise a "substantial" question about a lawyer's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness).
152. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2010) (prohibiting communication
about the subject matter of a lawyer's representation of a client with a person the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer).
153. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 04 (2005), available at 2005 WL 483384 (citing
S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 07 (1995)).
154. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 1 (2010).
155. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 13 (2004), availableat 2004 WL
3413897.
156. Id. (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 1 (2010)).
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Lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
The Deponent-Lawyer's testimony raises questions about his honesty in his
marriage and in the context of his divorce . . . .

However, does the

Deponent-Lawyer's testimony raise not merely a question but a substantial
question about his fitness to practice law?... With no other information
about the Deponent-Lawyer's conduct, it is impossible for us .

.

. to form a

judgment about whether his testimony raises a substantial question about his
fitness to practice.
Sometimes-perhaps often-people behave quite
differently during a hostile divorce than they do in other parts of their lives.
And, in this case, the Deponent-Lawyer did correct the record without
actually being confronted with evidence that forced him to do so. 1 5 7
An American Bar Association committee made essentially the same
point in an ethics opinion addressing the question of whether there is a
duty to report evidence of another lawyer's disability or impairment.' 5 8
The committee wrote:
[K]nowing that another lawyer is drinking heavily or is evidencing
impairment in social settings is not itself enough to trigger a duty to report
under Rule 8.3. A lawyer must know that the condition is materially
impairing the affected lawyer's representation of clients. 1 5 9
Of course, some aspects of private life do reflect on a lawyer's fitness to
represent a client. Thus, because "a lawyer's personal tax fraud and illegal
securities
transactions
...
involve
serious
dishonesty
and
untrustworthiness," they are subject to the duty to report.160
To some extent, the inquiry into a lawyer's fitness to practice law
requires an assessment of whether there is a reasonably foreseeable future
threat of harm to clients. Reflecting this reality, a committee of the
American Bar Association wrote, in an opinion addressing whether there is
a duty to report impairment of a firm lawyer, as follows:
If the mental condition that caused the violation has ended, no report is
required. Thus, if partners in the firm and the supervising lawyer reasonably
believe that the previously impaired lawyer has resolved a short-term
psychiatric problem that made the lawyer unable to represent clients
competently and diligently, there is nothing to report.16 '
157. Id

158. ABA Comm. on Ethics & ProfI Responsibility, Formal

Op. 431

(2003).

159. Id
160. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.4,

at 64-11 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
161. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 429 (2003).
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D. DisciplinaryStatutes ofLimitations
In some jurisdictions, the duty to report misconduct by another lawyer
is presumably limited by the fact that there is a disciplinary statute of
limitations.162 For example, in Texas, the Rules of Disciplinary Procedure
provide that:
No attorney licensed to practice law in Texas may be disciplined for
Professional Misconduct occurring more than four years before the time
when the allegation of Professional Misconduct is brought to the attention of
the Office of Chief Disciplinary Counsel, except in cases in which
disbarment or suspension is compulsory. Limitations will not begin to run
where fraud or concealment is involved until such Professional Misconduct
is discovered or should have been discovered in the exercise of reasonable
diligence by the Complainant.16 3

162. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN BAR R. 3-7.16(a) (2011) (indicating that, with certain
exceptions, "[i]nquiries raised or complaints presented by or to The Florida Bar ... shall be
commenced within 6 years from the time the matter giving rise to the inquiry or complaint is
discovered or, with due diligence, should have been discovered"); N.M. STAT. ANN. R. 17-303
(2011) ("Except in cases involving theft or misappropriation, conviction of a crime, or a knowing act
of concealment, no complaint ... shall be considered by the board unless a written complaint is filed
with or initiated by chief disciplinary counsel . .. within four (4) years from the time the complainant
knew or should have known the facts upon which the complaint is filed."); Ga. State Bar Rules &
Regs., R. 4-222(a) (2011) ("No proceeding ... shall be brought unless a Memorandum of Grievance
has been received at State Bar of Georgia headquarters or instituted by the Investigative Panel within
four years after the commission of the act. Provided, however, this limitation shall be tolled during
any period of time, not to exceed two years, that the offender or the offense is unknown, the
offender's whereabouts are unknown, or the offender's name is removed from the roll of those
authorized to practice law in this State."); Mo. Sup. Ct. Rules R. 5.085(a) (2011) (indicating that,
with certain exceptions, "[iinvestigations . . . may be undertaken only within five years after the chief
disciplinary counsel knows or should know of the alleged acts of misconduct"); N.H. Sup. Ct. Rules
R. 37A (2011) (providing, with numerous exceptions, that "no formal disciplinary proceedings shall
be commenced unless a grievance is filed . .. within two (2) years after the commission of the alleged
misconduct"); Pa. Disciplinary Bd. Rules § 85.10 (2011) (stating, with exceptions, that "[t]he Office
of Disciplinary Counsel or the Board shall not entertain any complaint arising out of acts or
omissions occurring more than four years prior to the date of the complaint"); W. Va. Lawyer
Discipline R. 2.14 (2011) ("Any complaint filed more than two years after the complainant knew, or
in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, of the existence of a violation of the Rules
of Professional Conduct, shall be dismissed by the Investigative Panel."); see also In re David, 651
S.E.2d 743, 745 (Ga. 2007) (finding a grievance barred by the state's four-year statute of limitations).
But see In re Allison, 481 S.E.2d 211, 215 (Ga. 1997) (holding that "where a victim or potential
victim does not come forward within the four-year statute of limitation under the Bar Rules by filing
a grievance against an attorney for misconduct under the professional standards, the State Bar may
take advantage of the two-year tolling period" to initiate disciplinary proceedings).
163. TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 15.06, reprinted in TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN., tit. 2,
subtir. G app. A-1 (West 2005). The sections in the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure dealing
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Similarly, a Colorado rule provides that:
A request for investigation against an attorney shall be filed within five years
of the time that the complaining witness discovers or reasonably should have
discovered the misconduct. There shall be no statute of limitations for
misconduct alleging fraud, conversion, or conviction of a serious crime, or
for an offense the discovery of which has been prevented by concealment by
the attorney.'"

If the statute of limitations for discipline has elapsed, no purpose is
served by imposing a mandatory duty to report misconduct to disciplinary
authorities. Although no case or ethics opinion appears to have addressed
this question, presumably the duty to report expires when the potential for
discipline lapses. "Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex."' 65 Thus, a statute
of limitations on discipline logically narrows the reporting duty.
Whether a disciplinary statute of limitations plays a role in
interpretation and application of the mandatory reporting rule is of
particular relevance to whether legal malpractice experts or litigators have a
duty to report misconduct. Legal malpractice claims may arise from facts
that occurred several years before, sometimes more than a decade earlier.
Malpractice litigation then often takes years to run its course. If whatever
duty a lawyer participating in the suit has to report misconduct does not
arise until the litigation terminates, as suggested above' 6 6 and discussed
below,1 6 7 it is entirely possible that the potential reporting duty expires
before it ever comes to fruition.
However, not all states have disciplinary statutes of limitations.16 1
Furthermore, in states with such provisions, like Texas, the pertinent
statutory language may create great uncertainties. 169 Consider the Texas
with Compulsory Discipline (Part VIII) indicate that a lawyer shall be suspended during a term of
probation for a "serious crime" (Rule 8.06) and disbarred when a conviction for an "intentional
crime" becomes final and in other limited circumstances (Rule 8.05).
164. COLO. R. Civ. P. 251.32(i) (2011).
165. United States v. McLaughlin, 170 F.3d 889, 895 (9th Cir. 1999). "The reason for the
law ceasing, the law also ceases." Id. at 895 n.1.
166. See supra Part I (discussing the duty to report).
167. See infra Parts IV, V (considering public policies, customary practices, and precedent in
favor of delayed reporting).
168. See, e.g., In re Wade, 814 P.2d 753, 764 (Ariz. 1991) ("Mhe statute of limitations does
not apply to bar discipline cases.... Laches does not apply when the complaining attorney cannot
show any prejudice resulting from the delay." (citations omitted)).
169. See, e.g., TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 15.06, reprintedin TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN.,
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rule's special treatment of misconduct involving fraud or concealment,
which are exempt from the usual limitations period. 17 0 The Texas
provision does not state a simple four-year statute of limitations applicable
to every kind of ethics infraction. 17 1 Rather, it imposes that restriction on
disciplinary liability only in certain types of cases.1 7 2
III.

CONFIDENTIALITY

According to the Restatement, "[t]he duty to disclose wrongdoing by
another lawyer typically does not require disclosure of confidential client
information
"
Consistent with this view, Model Rule 8.3
provides: "This Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise
protected by Rule 1.6 [(confidentiality)] or information gained by a lawyer
or judge while participating in an approved lawyers assistance
program."' 7 4 Most states recognize both of these exceptions, although
there is authority to the contrary."' In practical terms, the exception

tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1 (West 2005) ("No attorney licensed to practice law in Texas may be
disciplined for Professional Misconduct occurring more than four years before the time when the
allegation of Professional Misconduct is brought to the attention of the Office of Chief Disciplinary
Counsel, except in cases in which disbarment or suspension is compulsory.").
170. See id. ("Limitations will not begin to run where fraud or concealment is involved until
such Professional Misconduct is discovered or should have been discovered in the exercise of
reasonable diligence by the Complainant.").
171. See id. (delineating the time limitations on disciplining an attorney).
172. Id.
173. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i (2000).
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(c) (2010).

175. New Jersey departs considerably from the language found in Model Rule 8.3 and many
state codes, which create a broad exception to the duty to report knowledge of misconduct gained
from participation in a lawyers assistance program. Compare id. (exempting information of ethics
violations gained through participation in an approved lawyers assistance program from the reporting
requirement), with N.J. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.3(d) (2010) (requiring disclosure of ethics
violations obtained through participation in lawyers assistance program if the interests of clients are
substantially and imminently threatened). In some instances, the New Jersey rule imposes reporting
and other obligations. It provides:
(d) [The reporting obligation set forth in paragraph (a)] of this Rule shall not apply to
knowledge obtained as a result of participation in a Lawyers Assistance Program established by
the Supreme Court and administered by the New Jersey State Bar Association, except as
follows:
(i) if the effect of discovered ethics infractions on the practice of an impaired attorney is
irremediable or poses a substantial and imminent threat to the interests of clients, then attorney
volunteers, peer counselors, or program staff have a duty to disdose the infractions to the
disciplinary authorities, and attorney volunteers have the obligation to apply immediately for
the appointment of a conservator, who also has the obligation to report ethics infractions to
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relating to client confidences is far more important than the one dealing
with lawyer assistance programs.
A.

Client Consent and Other Exceptions

It is sometimes said that the confidentiality exception to the reporting
obligation means that a lawyer who discovers misconduct while
representing a client cannot report the misconduct to disciplinary
authorities without the client's consent.' 7 6 This is a useful "rule of
thumb," but it is not entirely accurate. In the Model Rules1 7 7 and all
state disciplinary codes,' 7 8 there are exceptions to confidentiality other
than client consent. If any of those exceptions apply, the public interest
underlying the duty to report trumps the client's interest in
confidentiality.' 7 9 For example, in In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No.
92-1,18o the Rhode Island Supreme Court approved an ethics opinion
which concluded that disclosure would be required if information was not
confidential because it could be disclosed
(1) "to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm" or
(2) in controversies between the lawyer and the client or when the lawyer
needs the information to establish a defense to a criminal or a civil charge
disciplinary authorities; and
(ii) attorney volunteers or peer counselors assisting the impaired attorney in conjunction with
his or her practice have the same responsibility as any other lawyer to deal candidly with clients,
but that responsibility does not include the duty to disclose voluntarily, without inquiry by the
client, information of past violations or present violations that did not or do not pose a serious
danger to clients.
Id.
176. See In re Ethics Advisory Panel Op. No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317, 319, 322 (R.I. 1993)
(holding that state ethics rules prohibited a lawyer from reporting the misconduct of another lawyer
without his client's consent if the lawyer learned of the misconduct during the course of
representation of the client).
177. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2010) (listing exceptions).
178. See THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2011 SELECTED STANDARDS ON
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 152-59 (2010) (setting forth a comprehensive table that lists
exceptions by state).
179. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Informal Op. 13 (2004), availableat 2004
WL 3413897 (recognizing that a lawyer's duty to report misconduct is "subject to the lawyer's duty
not to reveal information relating to representation without the client's informed consent or as
otherwise permitted by Rule 1.6 [(dealing with confidentiality)]"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i (2000) ("If disclosure of [confidential] information is subject
to an exception,... the duty to disclose applies.").
180. In re Ethics Advisory Panel Op. No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317 (R.I. 1993).
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Sometimes no exception to the obligation of confidentiality applies, in
which case "Rule 1.6 [or the parallel state provision] takes precedence over
any duty to report a client to a disciplinary authority."' 8 2 Thus, a Texas
ethics committee opined that, if the relevant information is confidential, a
lawyer need not report that another lawyer manifested incompetence and
neglect by failing to correct identified deficiencies in a domestic relations
order. 183
In an ethics opinion addressing whether a lawyer with knowledge of a
judge's improper failure to recuse had a duty to report that misconduct, an
American Bar Association committee reasoned as follows:
[WI e [do not] believe that any of the exceptions for permissive disclosure
under Rule 1.6(b) apply. The judge's failure to recuse never would, as a
practical matter, result in death or substantial bodily harm. It also is difficult
to imagine any circumstance in which the judge's failure to recuse
constituted a crime or fraud that would result in substantial financial injury
to another, in furtherance of which the judge is using the lawyer's services.
The lawyer may, of course, under Rule 1.6(b)(4), reveal the judge's
confidential information to another lawyer from whom the lawyer is seeking
counsel as to his ethical obligations.' 8 4
1.

Seeking Client Permission to Disclose

Lawyers are often urged to seek their clients' permission to disclose
evidence of professional misconduct. Thus, the commentary to Model
Rule 8.3 says that "a lawyer should encourage a client to consent to
disclosure where prosecution would not substantially prejudice the client's
interests."85 However, according to a Philadelphia ethics committee, if
the report of misconduct could disrupt the resolution of a pending case, a
181. Id. at 322.
182. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 449 (2007).
183. See Tex. Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 534, 63 TEx. B.J. 808, 808-09 (2000) (stating that
disclosure would be required if the information was not confidential).
184. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 449 (2007).
185. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.3 cmt. 2 (2010); see also ABA Comm. on
Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 453 (2008) (determining that in-firm ethics counsel is
not required to report knowledge of misconduct by a lawyer in the firm to disciplinary authorities,
"so long as the ethics counsel's information is information relating to the representation of her client
or clients, but the ethics counsel should seek appropriate client consent to report where disclosure is
not likely to harm the firm client").
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lawyer, in seeking consent, should "first disclose the circumstances to ...
clients, including the potential for delay in the litigation and/or
settlement."' 8
Under a Connecticut advisory opinion, if there are
financial risks to the client that might result from reporting, those should
be disclosed.' 7
According to the American Bar Association, in
representation involving a civil claim against another lawyer, a lawyer
seeking consent to file a grievance must disclose the possible effect that
filing may have "on the client's ultimate recovery in a malpractice
action."'1 8
In reality, the duty to disclose misconduct is subject to limitations so
potentially huge in scope as to make the "mandatory" nature of the
reporting obligation little more than an illusion.' 8 9 These limits include
the confidentiality exception to the reporting obligation;' 9 0 the weak
injunction that a lawyer "should" (not "shall") seek client consent; the duty
of a lawyer "to advise the client about the client's power to obliterate" the
reporting duty;' 9 ' and the inability of a lawyer to second-guess a client's
refusal to agree to reporting.192 Referring to the rule as "mandatory" may
do more to breed cynicism about the standards of the legal profession than
to ensure that misconduct is called to the attention of disciplinary
authorities.

186. Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof I Guidance Comm., Op. 13 (1995), availableat 1995 WL 528158.
187. See Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof I Ethics, Informal Op. 13 (2004), available at 2004
WL 3413897 (advising, in a discussion of alleged perjury by the client's husband in their divorce
proceedings, that "the Spouse's Lawyer should make sure the client understands the possible financial
risk to her and her children that could be created by the reporting and that she has the right to
withhold consent to disclosure").
188. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 433 (2004).
189. Cf 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
5 64.8, at 64-23 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (opining that Model Rule 8.3(c) "effectively eliminates the duty
to report another lawyer's misconduct in most cases that arise in the context of client
representation-which is to say most cases").
190. See supra Part III(A) (discussing the confidentiality exception and client consent).
191. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILuAM HODEs, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.8,
at 64-23 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
192. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & ProfI Responsibility, Formal Op. 433 (2004) ("As a
practical matter, clients have the ultimate authority when it comes to protecting confidential
information."); Phila. Bar Ass'n Prof I Guidance Comm., Op. 06 (1996), available at 1996 WL
337311 (indicating that the duty to report is "tempered" by the duty of confidentiality).
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Narrow Formulationsof the Confidentiality Limitation on Disclosure

In some states, the reporting rule does not exempt all confidential
information from the duty to report. For example, in Ohio, the relevant
rule provides only that "privileged knowledge" is exempt from the
reporting requirement. 193 In an ethics opinion, the Ohio Board of
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline expressly rejected the
argument that this language meant that reporting was not required if the
relevant information was protected by the state's ethics rule on
confidentiality. 1 94 Rather, the Board interpreted "privileged knowledge"
as referring to "1) the information imparted in a representation of a client
that would be protected by the attorney-client privilege, and 2) the
information [relating to lawyer assistance programs] that Rule 8.3(c)
identifies as privileged under the reporting rule." 19 5 Thus, the Board
concluded there was a "significant difference" between the ABA Model
Rule and the Ohio Rule, and noted: "Ohio did not ... choose to shield

from the reporting duty all of the information protected by Rule 1.6."196
C. Broad Formulationsofthe ConfidentialityLimitation on Disclosure
In some jurisdictions, the confidentiality exception to the reporting
obligation is worded much more broadly than the parallel provision in
Model Rule 8.3. For example, the provision in the Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct governing the reporting of professional misconduct
provides that: "This Rule does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege or by law .... "
Arguably, this type of provision might be interpreted to mean that a
lawyer serving as an expert has no duty to report knowledge of professional
misconduct related to a legal malpractice case. Under agency principles, a
testifying expert in a legal malpractice case is obliged to maintain the

available at
CONDUCT
R. 8.3
(2011),
193. OHIo
RULES
OF
PROF'L
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConducRules.pdf.
194. See Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Informal Op. 001 (2007),
available at 2007 WL 1232241 (rejecting the interpretation that "Rule 8.3 requires disclosure of
information relating to a representation only ifsuch disclosure is permitted by Rule 1.6(b)").
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. ILL. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2010) (emphasis added).
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confidentiality of nonpublic information entrusted to the expert.x9s
Therefore, the relevant information is protected by common law
principles, and disclosure might not be required.
D.

The Meaning of "Protectedby Rule 1.6"

Most state ethics codes do not contain language similar to the protectedby-law exception to the reporting obligation that is found in the Illinois
rules, discussed above. 1 9 9 Nevertheless, it may be possible to reach the
same conclusion by a reasonable interpretation of the words that are part
of many reporting standards. Model Rule 8.3, like numerous parallel state
provisions, provides that the duty to report "does not require disclosure of
information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6," which deals with
confidentiality of client information.200 Even though there is typically no
198. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) (assuming
that a "testifying expert owes a duty of confidentiality as well as other duties to the party on whose
behalf he is engaged to testify"). The Committee also noted that "[c]ourts .. . have either held or
assumed that a nonlawyer testifying expert .. . occupies a confidential relationship to the party on
whose behalf the expert originally was engaged that is limited to the matters on which he was engaged
as an expert." Id. at n.9. Some authorities have suggested that an expert witness owes a duty of
confidentiality to a client because the expert is a "subagent" of the client because the client's lawyer
engages the expert's services. See id. (postulating that "most courts would find that the lawyer
testifying expert is a subagent of the party on whose behalf he is engaged to testify"). However,
Professor DeMott, the reporter for the Restatement (Third) ofAgency has questioned the validity of the
subagency rationale. See Deborah A. DeMott, The Lauyer as Agent, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. 301, 320
(1998) (explaining why the assumption that a testifying expert is an agent of the lawyer, "if accepted
without qualification, is treacherous"). Indeed, the principles ultimately embodied in the Restatement
(Third) ofAgency do not seem to fit expert witnesses. A testifying expert in a legal malpractice case
does not, in any usual sense, act "subject to the control" of the engaging lawyer. Cf RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.15 cmt. b (2006) (stating that in a subagency relationship, the appointing
agent has the right and duty to control the subagent). The testifying expert is not performing
functions the engaging lawyer has consented to perform, nor is the engaging lawyer responsible for
the testifying expert's conduct. Cf id. § 3.15(1) ("A subagent is a person appointed by an agent to
perform functions that the agent has consented to perform on behalf of the agent's principal and for
whose conduct the appointing agent is responsible to the principal."). Moreover, a client is not
responsible to third parties for the conduct of a testifying expert. Cf id. § 3.15 cmt. d ("As to third
parties, an action taken by a subagent carries the legal consequences for the principal that would
follow were the action instead taken by the appointing agent."). Apparently, no case has yet squarely
addressed the issue of whether a testifying expert in a legal malpractice case is a subagent.
Nevertheless, there is wide agreement that, under some legal theory (perhaps because the testifying
expert is a coagent of the lawyer who engages the expert's services), a testifying expert has at least a
limited duty of confidentiality to the client on whose behalf the expert serves. See id. § 3.15 cmt. b
(contrasting subagency with coagency).
199. See supra Part III(C) (examining the broad formulations of the confidentiality limitation
on disclosure).
200. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(c) (2010).
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lawyer-client relationship between a testifying expert and the client on
whose behalf the expert has been engaged, 2 0 1 the relevant information
might nevertheless be regarded as protected by Rule 1.6. This is true
because (1) the information arises from an attorney-client relationship, (2)
a lawyer representing the client has a duty to protect client information in
hiring an expert to testify on the client's behalf,2 0 2 and (3) the expert has a
duty to maintain the confidentiality of client information during and after
the engagement.203 A client would be no less aggrieved by its expert's
unconsented use of confidential information in reporting misconduct than
it would by similar unconsented actions on the part of the client's
lawyer. 2 0 4 Indeed, "[t]he client may have a reasonable expectation that
201. See Commonwealth Ins. Co. v. Stone Container Corp., 178 F. Supp. 2d 938, 945 (N.D.
Ill. 2001) (finding that "the engagement between testifying expert and the retaining party does not
form an attorney-client relationship within the meaning of the ethical rules"); see also ABA Comm.
on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) (endorsing the view that "a lawyer serving
as a testifying expert does not thereby occupy a dient-lawyer relationship with the party for whom he
is engaged to testify"); infra Part IV(G)(3). But see Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers as Witnesses, 36
N.M. L. REV. 47, 68 (2006) (footnote omitted) ("The existence of an attorney-client relationship is a
question of fact [and iun any given case, a testifying lawyer-expert may share an attorney-client
relationship with the retaining party.").
202. In a wide range of circumstances, ethics opinions have recognized that lawyers entrusting
confidential client information to outside agents or businesses have a duty to exercise care. See, e.g.,
Cal. State Bar Standing Comm. on Profl Responsibility & Conduct, Formal Op. 165 (2004),
availableat 2004 WL 3079030 (dealing with the use of outside contract lawyers); N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 842 (2010), availableat 2010 WL 3961389 (dealing with online
storage of client information); Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Informal Op. 006
(2009), available at 2009 WL 2581719 (dealing with the outsourcing of legal or support services
domestically or abroad). In Cramer v. Sabine Transportation Co., 141 F. Supp. 2d 727 (S.D. Tex.
2001), a case denying a motion to disqualify a lawyer, the court stated that "an attorney, in a letter
retaining an expert, should clarify the expert's obligations of confidentiality." Id. at 733 (citing ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997)). The court's citation to Formal
Opinion 97-407 as authority for this proposition appears to have been a misreading of that opinion,
which talks about the duty of the lawyer-expert (not the retaining lawyer) to clarify matters relating to
the engagement. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) ("In
order to avoid any misunderstanding that no client-lawyer relationship is created, the testifying expert
should make his role clear at the outset of the engagement. A written engagement letter accepted by
both the engaging law firm and its client is much to be preferred.").
203. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 n.15 (1997) ("The
testifying expert's duties of confidentiality continue after the relationship with the party terminates.");
see also Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers as Witnesses, 36 N.M. L. REV. 47, 73 (2006) ("Lawyer-experts
... owe duties of loyalty to the parties that retain them under agency law principles. . . .").
204. Of course, the client's grievance might not be justified if the client was informed at the
outset of the relationship that the expert has a duty to disclose to disciplinary authorities knowledge
of professional misconduct. Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407
(1997) (stating that the testifying expert's "engagement letter should define the relationship,
including its scope and limitations, and should outline the responsibilities of the testifying expert,
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the expert will maintain confidential communications unless required to
divulge the information in the course of testimony." 2 0 5
It would be appropriate and judicious for a court or ethics committee to
adopt this line of analysis. Nevertheless, the matter is unresolved because
the question appears not to have been addressed.
1. Information from Other Sources or Publicly Known
Whenever the issue of an expert's duty to report misconduct is properly
raised, it may be necessary for the relevant authority to carefully consider
whether Rule 1.6 or similar language in the state reporting rules protects
the facts in question. Part of what an expert learns while working on a
legal malpractice case comes not from the client, but from the opposing
party. Much of that material is part of the public record, either by reason
of filing in court or as a result of testimony before a tribunal. Once facts
have entered the public domain, it might be argued that the information is
no longer confidential, for, as the Restatement explains, "Confidential client
information consists of information relating to representation of a client,
other than information that is generally known." 2 0 6 Moreover, "the
concept of confidentiality is not of unlimited scope, and it might not
include A's personal observation of outwardly visible signs of [misconduct,
such as] substance abuse." 2 0 7 Thus, the source of the facts relating to
misconduct, or the public nature of those facts, might be deemed relevant
to whether that information should be treated as protected by Rule 1.6.
Existing court decisions and ethics opinions dealing with reporting
obligations have generally not focused on these matters. 2 0 ' Rather, with

especially regarding the disclosure of client confidences").
205. Jett Hanna, Moonlighting Law Professors: Identifying and Minimizing the Professional
Liability Risk, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 421, 451 (2001).
206. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 59 (2000); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9(c)(1) (2010) (allowing use of information relating to
the representation of a former client "when the information has become generally known"); cf
VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW INA NUTSHELL 77 (West 2011) (advising that
"an expert must treat information learned in the course of working on the case confidentially, unless
the information has become a matter of public record or common knowledge, or some other
consideration permits revelation or use").
207. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.8,
illus. 64-4, at 64-24 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
208. But see Jett Hanna, Moonlighting Law Professors: Identifying and Minimizing the
ProfessionalLiabilityRisk, 42 S. TEX. L. REv. 421, 451 (2001) (stating that "[s]ome courts have held
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rare exceptions, 2 0 9 they have treated any information related to a case as
confidential within the meaning of Rule 1.6 or parallel state provisions.2 1 0
Thus, the comment to Model Rule 1.6 states, "The confidentiality
rule . .. applies not only to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its
source." 2 1 1 Whether authorities will continue to broadly interpret the
protection of client confidences when addressing the reporting obligations
of experts, rather than disclosures by the client's lawyer, is an unresolved
matter. The answers to these questions are not clear. 2 1 2 Perhaps rather
than expansively construe the "protected by Rule 1.6" language, authorities
will hold that, just as an expert is required to disclose confidential
information in his or her testimony,2 1 3 the expert is also required to
that expert witnesses can have a duty to maintain the confidences of clients to the extent that such
information did not have to be disclosed in the course of testimony" and citing authorities to support
this contention).
209. See Pa. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Legal Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Informal Op. 173
(1995), availableat 1996 WL 928112 (addressing whether a law firm had a duty to report that one of
its lawyers failed to disclose to various investors that he received substantial finder's fees related to the
firm's representation of the investors in two or three transactions). The lawyer received this
information from one of the clients and from a third-party developer. Id. The opinion took the
position that "you would need consent from your client to reveal confidential information obtained
from the client. But, any information which was disclosed/revealed not only by a client, but also by
'a third parry developer not represented by the law firm' is not confidential, and not subject to [the]
consent requirement." Id. (footnote omitted).
210. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 433 (2004) ("[Model
Rule 1.6] is not limited to communications protected by the attorney-client privilege or workproduct doctrine. Rather, it applies to all information, whatever its source, relating to the
representation. Indeed, the protection afforded by Rule 1.6 is not forfeited even when the
information is available from other sources or publicly filed, such as in a malpractice action against
the offending lawyer." (footnotes omitted)); see also ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility,
Formal Op. 431 (2003) (addressing the issue of whether there is a duty to report knowledge of
another lawyer's mental impairment). The committee first noted that "[i]n the usual case,
information gained by a lawyer about another lawyer is unlikely to be information protected by Rule
1.6, for example, observation of or information about the affected lawyer's conduct in litigation or in
the completion of transactions." Id. The committee then quickly reversed course, stating, "Given
the breadth of information protected by Rule 1.6, . . . the reporting lawyer should obtain the client's
informed consent to the disclosure in cases involving information learned in the course of
representation through interaction with the affected lawyer." Id. (footnote omitted).
211. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2010).
212. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 64.8, at 64-22 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (stating that "[ilt is not clear how broadly courts will interpret
Rule 8.3(c) [(the confidentiality exception)]").
213. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) (stating that
when a testifying expert becomes privy to confidential client information, the expert may need to
remind the engaging law firm and client "that his testifying may require the disclosure of
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disclose confidential information by the reporting rule.
IV.

PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AGAINST REPORTING DURING
PENDING LITIGATION

If an expert has a duty to report knowledge of another lawyer's
misconduct arising from the same facts as a malpractice claim, there are
good reasons for concluding that reporting may (and normally should) be
deferred until the conclusion of the malpractice litigation. These reasons,
which are discussed below, relate to the integrity of the malpractice and
grievance processes and the proper role of expert witnesses.
A.

Deference to the MalpracticeProcess

Even without the distractions of a parallel disciplinary proceeding, the
prosecution of a malpractice suit is difficult, complex, time-consuming,2 14
expensive, and emotionally draining. 2 1 5 Filing a grievance during the
pendency of a legal malpractice case would add to those challenges another
set of demands by ensnaring some of the principal participants in the
malpractice proceeding in a simultaneous and related, but nevertheless
different, controversy. In that ancillary dispute, the stakes would be high,
the procedures and standards of proof different, and the deadlines
distracting and potentially more demanding. 2 16 Presumably, the expert
filing the complaint, and perhaps other lawyers involved with the
malpractice proceeding, would have a duty to cooperate with the
investigation and prosecution of the disciplinary complaint. Most states
have a provision similar to Model Rule 8.1, which reads:
[A] lawyer . .. in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not . .. fail to

disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person
to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand
confidences").
214. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 8-10 (West
2011) (discussing the "costs of legal malpractice" and noting that legal malpractice litigation
"frequently takes years to run its course").
215. See Jennifer Knauth, Legal Malpractice: Wben the Legal System Turns on the Lawyer, 35 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 963, 965 (2004) (discussing the emotional and economic costs of being a malpractice
defendant).
216. See, e.g., TEX. RULES DISCIPLINARY P. R. 15.05, reprintedin TEx. Gov'T CODE ANN.,
tit. 2, subtir. G, app. A-I (West 2005) (identifying numerous mandatory deadlines in the Texas
grievance process).
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for information from a[] . . . disciplinary authority, except that this rule does

not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.217
At the very least, there is a risk that filing a grievance will divert time
and attention from the malpractice litigation in a way that makes the
prosecution of that type of civil proceeding even more costly and less
efficient than usual.
Courts have traditionally been sensitive to these types of systemic
disruption issues in their construction of ethics rules. For example, the
Second Circuit narrowly limited the duty of a lawyer to disclose fraud on a
tribunal to cases involving only "actual knowledge" in In re Grievance
Committee of the U.S. District Court, District of Connecticut.2 18 The court
wrote:
Our experience indicates that if any standard less than actual knowledge
was adopted in this context, serious consequences might follow. If attorneys
were bound as part of their ethical duties to report to the court each time
they strongly suspected that a witness lied, courts would be inundated with
such reports. Court dockets would quickly become overburdened with
conducting these collateral proceedings.

. .

. We do not believe that the

Code's drafters intended to throw the court system into such a morass.
. . . [T]he proper forum for resolving [the question of fraud] is not a

collateral proceeding, but is the trial itself.2 1 9
Except in cases where the alleged misconduct poses a clear and
substantial risk of future harm to a particular person or the public in
general, it can reasonably be argued the interests of the malpractice action
clients (both the plaintiff and the defendant), in obtaining a prompt and
efficient adjudication of their rights, weighs in favor of delayed reporting
to disciplinary authorities. Reflecting these types of concerns, some ethics
committees have declined to require trial lawyers to immediately report
alleged misconduct occurring during litigation. Thus, an ethics committee
in Connecticut wrote: "We are reluctant to create a bright line test . . . that
would turn trial lawyers into informers ... thereby introducing another
contentious and disruptive element into litigation, which is, all too often,

217. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.1(b) (2010).
218. In re Grievance Comm. of U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of Conn., 847 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1988).
219. Id. at 63.
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complicated, emotional, expensive, and protracted." 2 2 0
In an opinion condemning threats of disciplinary action in civil
litigation, an American Bar Association committee suggested that, at least
in some cases, reporting of misconduct may be delayed:
A lawyer who becomes aware of professional misconduct that raises a
substantial question as to a lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects should report that misconduct promptly, to the
extent required by Rule 8.3(a), and not use it as a bargaining chip in the civil
case. On the other hand, a well-founded report of misconduct which is not
required by Rule 8.3(a) to be reported, and which is not within the
jurisdiction of the trial court where the civil matter is pending, usually can
and should be postponed to the conclusion of the civil proceeding.2 2 1

Fear of interference with civil litigation also often influences the conduct
of state and local ethics committees. The authorities normally decline to
issue an advisory opinion addressing issues that are the subject of pending
court proceedings. 2 2
B.

The Expert's ProperRole

In legal malpractice cases, testifying expert witnesses typically play a
limited role. Often, they are not engaged until the parties are well into the
litigation, pleadings have been filed, numerous documents produced, and
many depositions taken.2
Generally, testifying experts do not
participate in the formulation of litigation strategy. 2 24 In fact, the
testifying expert may never even meet the client on whose behalf the expert
serves. In many instances, the law firm that hires the expert deliberately
withholds work product-related information from the expert, such as the

220. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Informal Op. 13 (2004), availableat 2004 WL
3413897.
221. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 383 (2004) (footnote
omitted) (emphasis added).
222. See, e.g., Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 04 (2001), availableat
2001 WL 694583 (noting that "it is generally the practice of the Committee on Professional Ethics
to decline to issue an Informal Opinion in matters which are pending before the superior court").
223. See generally VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NLTTSHELL 74-77
(West 2011) (discussing the role of expert witnesses).
224. Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) (stating that
"in-depth strategic and tactical involvement in shaping the issues, assistance in developing facts that
are favorable, and zealous partisan advocacy are characteristic of an expert consultant, who ordinarily
is not expected to testify" (emphasis added)).
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lawyers' concerns about factual support for issues in the case, the
credibility of witnesses, or appraisals of a suit's "settlement value." This is
done because the expert would have a duty to disclose that information
under oath if asked about those subjects by opposing counsel. Thus, a
testifying expert is normally not a full and active partner in the
management of the litigation. Ordinarily, the job of the testifying expert is
simply to review the facts in light of the legal standard of care and relevant
ethical considerations, and then formulate and express opinions related to
the issues in the case.
Not only would it be highly unusual for a testifying expert to file a
grievance against a lawyer participating in the malpractice litigation, but it
would also threaten to undermine the expert's role in the lawsuit. Experts
An expert who files a
are supposed to be objective, not partisan. 22
grievance during the pendency of a malpractice suit may be challenged by
opposing counsel as having lost his or her objectivity and taken on the role
of an advocate. Those charges could undermine the expert's effectiveness.
Consequently, reporting alleged misconduct to disciplinary authorities
while the malpractice lawsuit is pending might not only complicate and
delay the resolution of the civil claim, it might also damage the legal
interests of the client on whose behalf the expert has been hired.
C. Protectionof the Grievance Process
For disciplinary processes to be effective, they must not only be fair, but
must also have the appearance of fairness. 2 2 If an expert were to report
knowledge of serious misconduct during a pending malpractice suit, it
would look as though the grievance was filed to gain a strategic or tactical

225. See id. (stating that the testifying expert is "presented as objective and must provide
opinions adverse to the party for whom he expects to testify if frankness so dictates"); VINCENT R.
JOHNSON,

LEGAL

MALPRACTICE LAW IN

A NUTSHELL 76-77

(West

2011)

(discussing

independence versus partisanship).
226. Appearances of fairness are important in all areas of public life. See, e.g., Vincent R.
Johnson, Regulating Lobbyists: Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 14
(2006) ("[An] objective in regulating lobbyists is to preserve public confidence in political institutions
by ensuring that they are fair not only in operation, but also in appearance. In other words, it is
necessary to avoid the 'appearance of corruption.' Perceived corruption, like corruption itself, can
destroy a democratic institution." (footnotes omitted)); Vincent R. Johnson, Ethics in Government at
the Local Level, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 715, 735 (2006) (asserting that "the appearance of
impropriety is often as destructive of public confidence in government as impropriety itself").
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advantage in the malpractice litigation rather than to protect the public.
Courts, ethics committees, and other authorities have rightly expressed
concern about the abuse of legal procedures that occurs when a party
currently involved in litigation threatens to file a grievance against another
lawyer involved in the suit.2 2 7 Similar concerns can be raised about the
actual filing of a disciplinary complaint.
In many instances, it will benefit the disciplinary process for a
malpractice suit to run its course before that regime's limited resources are
devoted to the resolution of malpractice-related charges of misconduct. If
the alleged misconduct arises out of the same facts as the malpractice
claim, the development of the evidence that occurs in the civil litigation
process will typically provide a more complete record of what actually took
place than could usually be expected from a disciplinary investigation.
Those facts may assist the disciplinary tribunal in the resolution of
disputed issues. Moreover, a judicial finding that serious misconduct (e.g.,
a nonwaivable conflict of interest) did not occur may obviate the need for
reporting of such conduct to, or investigation of such conduct by,
disciplinary authorities.
In some instances, disciplinary tribunals have abstained from deciding

227. It is ordinarily unethical to threaten to file disciplinary charges to gain an advantage in a
civil cause of action. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 383 (1994)
(citing state ethics opinions and offering multiple reasons why threats may violate the Model Rules,
even though the Model Rules do not contain a rule expressly addressing that subject); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

5 cmt. i (2000) (stating that "the

objection has been made that threats to report an opposing lawyer are used unfairly by unprincipled
lawyers on the pretense that the disclosure rule requires it"). Texas has a rule specifically dealing with
disciplinary threats. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.04(b), reprintedin TEX.
GOv'T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9)
(providing that: "A lawyer shall not ... threaten to present: (1) ... disciplinary charges solely to gain
an advantage in a civil matter"); see also Me. Profl Ethics Comm'n, Op. 100 (1989), available at
http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/index.php?topic=mebaroverseers -ethics opinions&id=9150
1&v=article (construing a similar provision and broadly stating that "[it] is clear that it would be
unethical for Attorney A to threaten to present a grievance in order to enhance the chances of a
favorable settlement of [a] malpractice claim against Attorney Z"). It is important to note that both
the Texas rule and the Maine rule at issue in Ethics Opinion 100 refer to threatening to present a
grievance "solely to obtain an advantage." TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4.04(b);

Me. Profl Ethics Comm'n, Op. 100 (1989), available at http://www.maine.gov/tools/whatsnew/
index.php?topic=mebar.overseers ethics.opinions&id=91501&v=artide. Presumably, many threats
are made with mixed motives and therefore might escape the literal terms of a rule using the word
"solely."
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charges of misconduct that are the subject of pending litigation.22
Professors Thomas D. Morgan and Ronald D. Rotunda, two of the
nation's leading legal ethics experts, assert:
If there is a civil or criminal action pending involving the same conduct,
disciplinary authorities often prefer that the lawyer [with a duty to report]
wait until that action is completed. If the information comes in earlier, the
disciplinary authorities often suspend or abate their own inquiry so as to be
able to work with a complete record and avoid duplicative investigation. 22 9
Thus, many authorities recognize that deferred reporting of misconduct
is often consistent with the operation of both the civil justice system and
disciplinary processes.
V.

CUSTOMARY PRACTICE AND PRECEDENT

A. In FavorofDelayed Reporting
The public policy considerations in favor of not requiring a report of
lawyer misconduct during the pendency of litigation are reflected in
prevailing professional customs. According to the Restatement- "With
respect to timing of a report of wrongdoing, the requirement is commonly
interpreted not to require a lawyer involved in litigation or negotiations to
make a report until the conclusion of the matter in order to minimize
harm to the reporting lawyer's client." 2 3 0
Commentators have expressed similar views. For example, Professor
Arthur F. Greenbaum of Ohio State University, who has written
extensively about lawyers' and judges' reporting obligations,231 states that
"unless there is a need to report the lawyer immediately to protect the
public, the report can properly be delayed until the case has
concluded."2 3 2

228. THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS 58 (10th ed. 2008).
229. Id.
230. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE IAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 5 cmt. i (2000).
231. See generallyArthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney's Duty to Report ProfessionalMisconduct:
A Roadmapfjr Refrm, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 298 (2003).

232. Arthur F. Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting of Lauyer Misconduct, 77 UMKC L. REV. 537,
548 (2009).
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An official comment to the Massachusetts ethics rules addresses the
point squarely. The comment states:
In most situations, a lawyer may defer making a report under this Rule until
the matter has been concluded, but the report should be made as soon as
practicable thereafter. An immediate report is ethically compelled, however,
when a client or third person will likely be injured by a delay in reporting,
such as where the lawyer has knowledge that another lawyer has embezzled
client or fiduciary funds and delay may impair the ability to recover the
funds. 2 3 3
Thus, some authorities suggest that the option of delayed reporting is
not unqualified. Nevertheless, there is much to be said in favor of a
bright-line rule that a testifying expert has no duty to report knowledge of
litigation-related misconduct during the pendency of the suit. To begin
with, there is a need for clarity in the interpretation and application of
ethical standards. Rules of professional conduct are most effective when
they give lawyers clear guidance about what they must or must not do.2 3
Requiring lawyers engaged in litigation to undertake a quadruple-layered
analysis about reporting obligations is undesirable because it threatens to
make litigation more difficult, expensive, and time-consuming. 2 3 5
Moreover, in reality, a postponed reporting obligation will have little effect
on what occurs before the resolution of a case. Lawyers who feel morally
compelled to report misconduct will be sufficiently persuasive to secure
their clients' consent to the making of a report.2 3 6 Lawyers who are
reluctant to initiate disciplinary proceedings will persuade clients that
using confidential information for the purpose of reporting is unwise, and
therefore, reporting will not be required.2 3
It is highly unlikely that a
judge hearing a legal malpractice case will, pursuant to obligations of
legal 2 38 or judicial 2 3 9 ethics, make a report of misconduct before the
233. MASS. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 3A (2010).
234. Cf Vincent R. Johnson, Corruption in Education: A Global Legal Challenge, 48 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 1, 33 (2008) ("Ethics codes should be clearly written. Whenever possible, they
'should contain bright-line rules and never three-armed lawyer gobbledygook-that is, on the one
hand this, on . .. the other hand that, and on the third hand something else.'" (quoting Mark Davies,
GovernmentalEthics Laws: Myths and Mythos, 40 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 177, 178-79 (1995))).
235. See supra Part IV(A) (detailing the inherent difficulties of prosecuting a malpractice suit).
236. See supra Part III(A) (discussing the requirement of client consent).
237. Id.
238. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.3 (2010) (providing the reporting duties
of lawyers). Of course, some judges are not lawyers or are lawyers not currently licensed to practice
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Otherwise, the judge might, quite
conclusion of the suit.2 4 0
appropriately, be subject to challenge on the ground of having prejudged
the merits of the case or otherwise demonstrated prejudice against the
lawyer in question. 2 4 1 Consequently, the only lawyer participating in
malpractice litigation who is likely to be compelled to make a report
during litigation by reason of the lack of a bright-line rule is the legal
malpractice expert, who, as explained above, should, but may not, be
permitted to invoke the argument that the information is "protected by
Rule 1.6."242 Yet, for the reasons alluded to earlier, requiring a testifying
expert to report misconduct before the conclusion of the litigation
threatens to disrupt the prosecution of civil action and call into question
the expert's independence and objectivity, all to the disadvantage of the
client on whose behalf the expert appears. 24 3 The better view is that
testifying experts ordinarily should not be required to report litigationrelated misconduct during the pendency of suit, even though, as a matter
of discretion, that is their option.
Professors Hazard and Hodes caution that "disciplinary. .. authorities
might look askance at any absolute right to delay reporting as imposing too
high a cost on the public." 2 4 4 If authorities ultimately do not adopt a
bright-line rule wholly excusing testifying experts from a duty to report
misconduct during the pendency of litigation, then the duty to report
during that interval should be limited to the clearest of cases. Only where
law. In either case, those judges are not subject to lawyers' reporting obligations. See RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN S. DzIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE 1237
n.2 (2010-2011) (indicating that in 1983, 14,000 judges were not licensed to practice law).
239. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.15(B) (2010) (setting forth the reporting
duties ofjudges); see also supra Part VI(B)(2) (discussing judicial reporting responsibilities).
240. It is interesting to note that in the best-known case imposing discipline for litigationrelated nonreporting, In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (Ill. 1988), a lawyer was sanctioned, but a judge
who became privy to the same facts was not sanctioned. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN S.
DZIENKOWSKI, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A STUDENT'S GUIDE 1229-30 (2010-2011)
(discussing the significance of the Himmel decision and the court's omission of any discussion with
regard to a judge's duty to report).
241. See MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2010) (discussing the duties of impartiality
and fairness).
242. See supra Part III(D) (discussing the "protected by Rule 1.6" language).
243. See supra Part IV(B) (detailing the expert's proper role in pending litigation).
244. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.8,
illus. 64-4, at 64-25 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) ("Delay for the duration of a litigated case might mean that
a lawyer could continue to avoid discipline for several years, and such a long delay could interfere
with later prosecution of the disciplinary matter.").
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reasonably certain future harm to a particular person, or the public in
general, could be avoided by subjecting a lawyer to disciplinary action for
"known'24 prior misconduct should an expert be obliged to report an
ethical violation related to on-going litigation.
Some lawyers undoubtedly carry out their reporting obligations and
assist disciplinary authorities with the task of policing the profession. 2 4
Nevertheless, it may be that the current reporting regime-with its
mandatory rule, strict requirements, and broad exceptions-is
"unworkable, unwanted, and subject to massive civil disobedience." 24 7 If
that is the case, the solution is not to construe the rules in a way that
broadly places testifying experts under a duty to disclose misconduct
relating to legal malpractice actions. Rather, the solution is to address the
root of the problem by abolishing the duty to report and making reporting
discretionary, or reconsidering the broad exception relating to certain types
of confidential information.
B. Against Delayed Reporting
Some authorities, on particular facts, have endorsed a position against
delayed reporting. For example, in Schuff v. A. T Klemens & Son, 2 4 the
defendant in a wrongful death suit unsuccessfully sought to disqualify the
plaintiffs' lawyers on grounds of conflict of interest. 2 5 0 After six years of
litigation, 2 5 ' the defendant's lawyers argued that the verdict in favor of the
plaintiffs was "so tainted" by the conflict that the defendant should be
"allowed a new trial with respect to both liability and damages." 2 5 2
Although the Supreme Court of Montana rejected that argument, the
245. See supra Part II(B) (discussing the knowledge requirement).
246. See, e.g., In re Wirth, No. 07-0588, 2008 WL 5340120, at *3 (Ariz. Disciplinary Comm'n
July 8, 2008) (indicating that a successor lawyer filed a complaint against the predecessor pursuant to
Arizona Rule 8.3); In re William E. O'Keefe, No. BD-2005-015, 2005 WL 5177206, at *2 (Mass.
State Bar Disciplinary Bd. March 18, 2005) (stating that a matter that led to a lawyer's nine-month
suspension came to the "attention of bar counsel pursuant to Mass. R. [Prof'1 Conduct] 8.3").
247. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILuAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.9,
at 64-27 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
248. Id. (opting for the latter alternative).
249. Schuffv. A.T. Klemens & Son, 16 P.3d 1002 (Mont. 2000).
250. Id. at 1006, 1010, 1014.
251. Id. at 1012.
252. See id. at 1010, 1012 (arguing that the plaintiffs' claim should be barred by the doctrine
of laches).
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court referred the matter to state disciplinary authorities to consider
whether the plaintiffs' lawyers had violated the conflict of interest rules and
whether the defendants' lawyers had failed to make a timely report of
serious misconduct. 2 5 3 As the court explained:
If the "obvious" prejudice suffered by its client was in fact so severe, and the
court's failure to disqualify the Marra firm was "entirely inconsistent with
public policy," it would seem that a reasonable course of action would
include the timely observance of Rule 8.3's mandate.
Instead, what the record reveals is that Klemens did nothing for six
years ... 254
The Montana Supreme Court emphasized that the case was "unusual"
in that defense counsel had argued that the alleged misconduct was "so
serious that we should . . . set aside a substantial jury verdict in favor of an
innocent widow and her children . . . [and] send a case that already has
been in litigation for ten years back to the District Court for retrial." 2 5
The court remarked that:
[T]he [ethics] Rules are not designed to be employed as arrows in the
litigator's quiver, to be loosed from time to time at targets of opportunity as
the ebb and flow of an adversarial proceeding may appear to dictate. Quite
simply, a serious .

.

. violation [of the state's Rules of Professional Conduct]

is a serious matter that needs to be taken seriously and reported promptly to
the Commission. 2 5 6
Ultimately, the Schuff decision resulted in the filing of disciplinary
complaints against six lawyers. The ensuing litigation consumed three
years. Three of the lawyers were publicly sanctioned.
No public
sanctions were imposed for failure to report misconduct. The lawyer who
prosecuted those six cases pro bono received an award from the Montana
State Bar for his pivotal role in resolving them. 2

253. Id. at 1016.
254. Id. at 1014.
255. Id. at 1015.
256. Id. at 1016.
257. See In re Marra, 87 P.3d 384, 384 (Mont. 2004) (representing two directly adverse clients
without the client's consent led to the public censure of a lawyer); In re Wenz, 87 P.3d 376, 377
(Mont. 2004) (sanctioning an attorney for violating Rule 1.10, concerning conflicts of interest); In re
Johnson, 84 P.3d 637, 637 (Mont. 2004) (censuring a lawyer publicly for dual representation of two
clients who were directly adverse).
258. 2004 Award Winners, 30 MONT. LAW., Sept. 2004, at 5, 6 (indicating that the
disciplinary commission's recommendations were approved).
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Some lawyers (perhaps incorrectly) have interpreted the Montana
Supreme Court's decision in Schuff as imposing a broad duty to report
possibly unethical conduct to disciplinary authorities. In one case, a lawyer
wrote a letter to opposing counsel pointing out a "potential positional
conflict [of interest]." 2
Unsatisfied with opposing counsel's response,
the lawyer reported the matter to the Montana Office of Disciplinary
Counsel because "she believed it was her duty to do so" under Montana
Rule 8.3 and the Schuffdecision.2 6 0

VI.

DUTY To REPORT AFTER THE MALPRACTICE ACTION TERMINATES

Even if a lawyer serving as an expert witness in malpractice litigation is
excused from reporting misconduct during the pendency of the suit, the
expert may have a duty to disclose the misconduct after the litigation
terminates (if confidentiality obligations are not interpreted to bar such
reporting2 6 1 and if a disciplinary statute of limitations has not
expired). 2 6 2 In this regard, it is useful to remember that cases suggest that
exceptions to the reporting obligation should be no greater than necessary.
For example, in In re Ethics Advisory Panel Opinion No. 92-1,263 the
Rhode Island Supreme Court held that confidentiality of client
information creates an exception to the reporting obligation.2 6 4 The
court nevertheless opined with regret that, when the reporting rule is
construed in a way that does not facilitate the investigation and
prosecution of errant lawyers, there is "correspondingly a failure of the
legal profession to regulate itself effectively" and "[t]his failure fuels the
perception that under a cloak of confidentiality, the legal profession is
engaged in a coverup of attorney misconduct." 2 6 5

259.
260.
261.
262.
to report).
263.
264.
265.

In re Best, 229 P.3d 1201, 1202 (Mont. 2010).
Id.
See supra Part III (analyzing the confidentiality exception to the duty to report).
See supra Part II(D) (describing the effect of disciplinary statutes of limitations on the duty
In re Ethics Advisory Panel Op. No. 92-1, 627 A.2d 317 (R.I. 1993).
Id. at 319-21.
Id. at 323.
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Promptness

If there is a post-litigation duty to report misconduct, questions arise as
to how soon the report must be made. Cases sometimes suggest that
performance of the duty to report misconduct cannot be delayed. Thus,
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that:
Once the lawyer decides that a reportable offense has likely occurred,
reporting should be made promptly. The need for prompt reporting flows
from the need to safeguard the public and the profession against future
wrongdoing by the offending lawyer. This purpose is not served unless Rule
8.3(a) is read to require timely reporting under the circumstances
presented. 2 6 6
However, other writings suggest that, with respect to the reporting of
lawyer misconduct, the maker of the report has some degree of discretion.
For example, a New York state ethics committee opined that: "The report
need not be made immediately or without some reasonable effort at
remediation, particularly where the consequences of reporting the violation
may be more harmful to the lawyer's client than some alternative course of
action." 2 6 7
B.

Disclosureto a Court
In some cases, the misconduct in question will have been disclosed to a

266. In re Riehlmann, 891 So. 2d 1239, 1247 (La. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Laurel
Fedder, Obstacles to Maintainingthe Integrity of the Profession: Rule 8.3's Ambiguity and Disciplinary
Board Complacency, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 571, 574-77 (2010) (explaining how the lack of
timely reporting undermines the policies underlying the reporting obligation).
267. N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 822 (2008), available at 2008 WL
8013056. However, one ethics opinion offered the following advice:
The Committee has not read the desirability of prompt reporting to exclude the possibility of
some delay in reporting when a lawyer's ethical obligation to a client necessitates such a delay.
There may be situations in which it is appropriate for a lawyer to balance a client's interest,
which may be furthered by a delay in reporting, against the public's interest in prompt reporting
of misconduct by a lawyer who may engage in similar misconduct again if not disciplined. In
determining whether there is room for judgment as to how promptly a report must be made, a
lawyer should balance the severity of the misconduct engaged in by the other lawyer and the
likelihood that he or she will engage in such misconduct again in the future to the detriment of
other clients against the degree of prejudice that the reporting lawyer's client will suffer from
prompt reporting. While it may be permissible in certain limited circumstances to postpone
reporting for a brief period of time, . . . "once a lawyer decides that he or she must disclose
under DR 1-103(A), any substantial delay in reporting would be improper."
N.Y.C. Ass'n of the Bar Comm. on ProfI & Jud. Ethics, Formal Op. 03 (1990) (citation omitted).
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court during the malpractice litigation, either by the expert's own
testimony or otherwise. In other cases, the relevant infractions will not
have been called to the malpractice tribunal's attention.
In cases where a judge has become aware of the allegedly unethical
conduct, it may be asked whether that disclosure extinguishes whatever
duty the expert may have to report the misconduct. In answering this
question, at least two issues need to be considered. Those issues relate to
the meaning of "appropriate professional authority," as that term is often
used in reporting rules, and the concept of "shifting responsibility." These
matters are discussed below.
1. What is an "Appropriate Professional Authority"
Model Rule 8.3, like similar provisions in many states, mandates that a
report of serious misconduct by another lawyer be made to the
"appropriate professional authority." 2 " The question is whether a court
presiding over malpractice litigation comes within the scope of that term.
a.

Disciplinary Bodies

The term "appropriate professional authority" presumably includes at
least a grievance authority that is part of the state's professional disciplinary
process. Thus, a Philadelphia ethics committee opined that "it is clear that
the duty to report misconduct as contained in Rule 8.3(a) refers to making
a report to the Disciplinary Board of the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania." 2 6 9 The committee found that "[a]lthough a report may
have been made to [the] court during a trial, reporting to the Court is
distinct from the obligation to report to the Disciplinary Board." 2 7 0
Further, the committee noted that "[e]ven if a report to the court has
already been made, a subsequent report to the Disciplinary Board still
requires a waiver based on informed consent ... of any confidential
information needed to make the report." 2 7 '
Similarly, in Schuff v. A. T Kemens & Son, mentioned earlier, the

268. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCr R. 8.3(a) (2010).
269. Phila. Bar Ass'n Profl Guidance Comm., Op. 2008-12 (2009), available at 2009 WL

467850.
270. Id.
271. Id
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Montana Supreme Court held that even though an alleged conflict of
interest was called to the attention of a district court as the ground for an
unsuccessful disqualification motion, the misconduct should also have
been reported to disciplinary authorities.2 7 2 Noting that the relevant
Montana ethics rule provided that a lawyer "shall inform the appropriate
professional authority," 27 3 the court explained: "[T]his Court, and the
agency to which it has delegated disciplinary authority, the Commission
on Practice, has the exclusive authority to discipline or sanction the
unprofessional conduct of attorneys admitted to practice before it." 2 7 4
Likewise, the Ohio Board of Commissioners on Grievances and
Discipline concluded that the phrase "shall inform a disciplinary
authority,"2 7 5 in the Ohio ethics rules, required that a report be made "to
either the Office of Disciplinary Counsel or to a certified grievance
committee of a bar association. "276 Specifically, the board wrote:
The reporting duty is not fulfilled by reporting a lawyer's misconduct to a
tribunal. A tribunal is not a disciplinary authority empowered to investigate
or act upon reports of lawyer misconduct. A tribunal has authority to
supervise members of the bar appearing before it, including the power to
disqualify attorneys in specific cases, but that authority is distinct from the
exclusive disciplinary authority vested in the Supreme Court of Ohio
through its inherent and constitutional powers. 2 7 7
However, in some states, the term "appropriate professional authority,"
or similar language, may cover a broader range of options than simply
reporting misconduct to state disciplinary officials. For example, "a few
federal courts maintain their own disciplinary agency; in those
jurisdictions, therefore[,] a lawyer might report misconduct relating to a
federal matter directly to such an agency. "278
In an ethics opinion addressing what a law firm should do when it

272. Schuffv. A.T. Klemens & Son, 16 P.3d 1002, 1012 (Mont. 2000).
273. Id
274. Id. at 1010-11.

275. OHIo

RuLEs

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

R.

8.3(a)

(2011),

available at

http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/LegalResources/Rules/ProfConduct/profConductRules.pdf.
276. Ohio Bd. of Comm'rs on Grievances & Discipline, Informal Op. 001 (2007), availableat
2007 WL 1232241.
277. Id
278. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLAM HODES, THE LAW OF IAWYERING § 64.5,
at 64-13 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (footnote omitted).
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discovers that a lawyer who recently joined the firm provided false
information about his qualifications, a Texas committee opined that "other
appropriate authorities would include the Board of Law Examiners,
Admissions Committee and the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee
of Texas and other states to which he may have applied for admission. "279
The opinion suggested that the firm was obliged to report the misconduct
to all of these entities, not just one of them. 2 8 0 However, that view may
have been expressed because the committee misread the reporting rule as
referring to "appropriate disciplinary authorities,"2 8 1 plural, even though
the Texas reporting rule obliges a lawyer to disclose misconduct to "the
appropriate disciplinary authority," singular.2 8
b.

Peer Assistance Programs

The Texas ethics rules sometimes permit reporting to a body other than
a disciplinary tribunal. 28 The relevant rule provides:
A lawyer having knowledge or suspecting that another lawyer or judge
whose conduct the lawyer is required to report . . . is impaired by chemical

dependency on alcohol or drugs or by mental illness may report that person
to an approved peer assistance program rather than to an appropriate
disciplinary authority. If a lawyer elects that option, the lawyer's report to
the approved peer assistance program shall disclose any disciplinary
violations that the reporting lawyer would otherwise have to disclose to the
[appropriate disciplinary authority]..
Scholars have expressed the view that, even in the absence of this type of
provision, "it would seem that ... reporting to a Lawyers Assistance
Program should be sufficient to constitute reporting to the appropriate
professional authority."2 8 5

279. Tex. Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 522, 60 TEx. B.J. 970 (1997).
2 8 0. Id.
281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. TEx. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.03(a), repinted in TEX. Gov'T
CODE ANN., cit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9) (emphasis
added).
283. Id. R. 8.03(c).
284. Id.
285. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLLAM HODES, THE IAW OF LAWYERING § 64.5,
at 64-14 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. § 64.8 illus. 64-4, at 6424 (stating that, "[iun at least some states, reporting to a lawyer's assistance committee is sufficient to
satisfy" the reporting obligation, and a "report to the disciplinary authority is not necessary").
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Courts

In some jurisdictions, the relevant reporting provision may expressly
allow a lawyer to report misconduct to a court, rather than to a disciplinary
committee.2 8 For example, Rule 8.3 of the North Carolina Rules of
Professional Conduct requires a lawyer to report serious misconduct to
"the North Carolina State Bar or the court having jurisdiction over the
matter."2 8 7 Similarly, Rule 8.3 of the New York Rules of Professional
Conduct now provides that "a lawyer shall report [serious misconduct] to a
tribunal or other authority empowered to investigate or act upon such
violation." 28 8 Interpreting similar language in an earlier New York ethics
code, an advisory opinion found that "a violation in the course of litigation
could be reported to the tribunal before which the action is pending." 28 9
The New York state ethics committee further opined that "[ol]nce a report
has been made to an appropriate authority, notwithstanding the existence
of other authorities to which the report could have been made, the
reporting lawyer's obligation . . . will be deemed satisfied." 2 90 Thus, in
some states, calling the attention of a court to litigation-related misconduct
discharges a lawyer's duty to report.
This may be true even in the absence of language in a reporting rule
expressly providing for disclosure to a court. Thus, Professors Geoffrey C.
Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes have argued that "[a] nother 'authority'
well positioned to receive reports of lawyer misconduct might be the
tribunal itself, when the misconduct involves conduct occurring during
litigation," and that this approach of reporting to the tribunal is often
sound.2 9 1
d.

Particular Entities

Some states have eschewed the Model Rules' reference to "appropriate

286.
287.
288.
289.
8013056.
290.

See supra Part VI(B)(1)(a) (discussing disciplinary authorities other than courts).
N.C. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
N.Y. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010) (emphasis added).
N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Op. 822 (2008), available at 2008 WL
Id.

291. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILUIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.5,

at 64-14 to 64-15 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (noting that "lawyers ... might reasonably assume that a
report to the court is a report to 'the system,' broadly speaking").
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professional authority" in their respective reporting rules and clearly specify
who must be informed about misconduct. For example, in Kentucky, a
lawyer "shall inform the Association's Bar Counsel,"2 9 2 and in Louisiana,
In North
the lawyer "shall inform the Office of Disciplinary Counsel." 2
Dakota, a lawyer must "initiate proceedings under the North Dakota Rules
for Lawyer Discipline."2 9 1
2.

Shifting Responsibility

Under the law of most jurisdictions, judges have a duty to address
serious lawyer misconduct that comes to their attention.2 9 In states with
judicial ethics codes patterned after the American Bar Association's Model
Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge with "knowledge that a lawyer has
committed a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct that raises a
substantial question regarding the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects" has a duty to "inform the appropriate
"'Appropriate authority' means the authority having
authority." 2 9 6
responsibility for initiation of disciplinary process in connection with the
In addition, "[a] judge who receives
violation to be reported." 2 9 7
information indicating a substantiallikelihood that a lawyer has committed
a violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct" need only "take
appropriate action." 2 9 8 "Appropriate action may include, but is not
limited to, communicating directly with the judge who may have violated
this Code, communicating with a supervising judge, or reporting the suspected violation to the appropriate authority or other agency or body." 2 9 9
292. KY. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.130(8.3)(a) (2010).
293. LA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010).
294. N.D. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010).
295. Although judges have a duty to report serious misconduct including criminal activity, by
lawyers and judges, they generally do not have a duty to report such misconduct on the part of a
witness who is not a lawyer or a judge. See Ill. Jud. Ethics Comm., Op. 01 (2002), availableat 2002
WL 32181518 (citing authorities from various jurisdictions and stating that "[to require the
reporting of every incident of past or present marijuana use, building code violations, tax violations,
bad checks, consumer fraud, or any of the other myriad of criminal violations a judge may become
aware of would immerse the judge in side issues, take time away from the judicial function and likely
compromise the judge's appearance of impartiality").
296. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT R. 2.15(B) (2010) (emphasis added).
297. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT Terminology.
298. Id. R. 2.15(D) (emphasis added).
299. Id. R. 2.15 cmt. 2; see also In re Irons, 379 B.R. 680, 684 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2007) (noting
that, under Texas law, a federal bankruptcy court "could refer counsel who violated State Bar

2011]

Legal MalpracticeLitigation and the Duty to Report Misconduct

99

Courts are sometimes diligent in performing these obligations. 3 0 0 For
example, in Johnson v. Johnson,3 o' Justice Catherine M. Stone wrote for
the Texas Court of Appeals:
In light of counsel's disparaging remarks about the trial court, his firm
adherence to those remarks during oral argument, and his claims of error
about matters that never occurred or were never presented to the trial court,
a substantial question has been raised about counsel's honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer. Consequently, we are bound ... to
inform the State Bar of Texas of this matter. We therefore order the Clerk
of the Court . . . to forward a copy of this opinion to the Office of the

General Counsel of the State Bar of Texas, for investigation and any other
action it may deem necessary. 3 0 2
However, according to Professor Greenbaum, "conventional wisdom"
and "several recent studies" suggest that the rule requiring judicial
reporting of lawyer misconduct "often is ignored" and that there is "severe
under-reporting." 3 0 3
Greenbaum argues that it is both feasible and
desirable for judges to play a greater role in reporting lawyer misconduct
and outlines improvements to the current reporting regime that would
help to advance that objective. 3 0
Nevertheless, as the system of judicial ethics currently operates, there is
little reason to conclude, absent language expressly permitting a lawyer to
discharge his or her reporting obligation by calling misconduct to the
attention of a tribunal, that the existence of a judicial reporting obligation
should or does relieve a lawyer of a duty to make a report to disciplinary
authorities.
To put the point slightly differently, does the duty to report shift from
the lawyer to the judge once the judge knows of another lawyer's
misconduct? General tort principles would argue against that conclusion.
Under tort law, a person with a duty to exercise care is generally not
obligations to the appropriate disciplinary authorities").
300. See Cap Rock Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Tex. Util. Elec. Co., 874 S.W.2d 92, 103 (Tex. App.El Paso 1994, no writ) (noting, on rehearing of a case involving deliberate deception, that the court's
'previous directive to forward a copy of the opinion in the instant case to the State Bar of Texas for
disciplinary action, while unprecedented, [was] nonetheless appropriate").
301. Johnson v. Johnson, 948 S.W.2d 835 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1997, writ denied).
302. Id. at 841 (citations omitted).
303. Arthur F. Greenbaum, Judicial Reporting of Lauryer Misconduct, 77 UMKC L. REV. 537,
537-41 (2009).
304. Id. at 551, 563.
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absolved from liability merely because some other person has a similar
obligation. Instead, the responsibility for preventing harm shifts from one
person to another only when it is fair to relieve the one of any further
duties.3 o5 This is sometimes true where one party has done everything
reasonably possible to prevent harm and another person can be trusted to
take charge of a matter.3 0 6 When this type of analysis is applied to the
reporting of lawyer misconduct, there is little reason to conclude that a
lawyer with knowledge of serious misconduct should be relieved from a
reporting obligation merely because a judge knows of the same misconduct
and has an obligation to report it. The lawyer has not done everything
possible to prevent the harm that can be caused by nonreporting, and it
will often be less than certain that a judge will call the misconduct to the
attention of appropriate disciplinary authorities.
C. How the MalpracticeAction Was Resolved
In thinking about whether a testifying expert has a duty to report
misconduct after the conclusion of a malpractice dispute, it is possible to
draw a useful distinction between judicially proven claims and unproven
claims. However, no useful inferences can be drawn merely from the fact
that a malpractice claim was settled or abandoned. These matters are
discussed below.
1. Proven Versus Unproven Malpractice Claims
a.

Judicial Findings of Liability

The post-litigation duty of a testifying expert to make a report about
misconduct would logically be the strongest in a case where the allegedly
errant lawyer was found liable for malpractice involving the misconduct in
question. In that case, the decision of the jury, judge, or appellate tribunal
would obviously be an important factor bearing upon whether a reasonable
lawyer would conclude, and therefore the expert must know, that serious

305. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 452(2) & cmts. e-f (1965) (discussing factors
bearing upon whether "full responsibility for control of the situation and prevention of the
threatened harm has passed to the third person").
306. See VINCENT . JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 119-24 (West
2011) (discussing the concept of shifting responsibility in legal malpractice law).
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misconduct occurred.3 o7 However, it is important to consider the side of
the case on which the expert testified.
If the expert testified on the plaintiffs behalf that the defendant lawyer
committed malpractice, the expert's own testimony would presumably
often show that the expert had a firm opinion that serious misconduct
occurred. In the litigation leading to the malpractice judgment, it is likely
that the facts relating to the alleged malpractice would have been disclosed.
Thus, it would be difficult for the expert to argue that the information
relating to the misconduct need not be revealed because it is
confidential. 3 0 s
In contrast, the defendant's expert would stand in a significantly
different position. Presumably, the expert would have testified under oath
that the defendant did not commit malpractice. If the malpractice was
related to the alleged misconduct, this would be a relevant factor in
determining whether the expert "knew" that misconduct had occurred.
Indeed, it would seem the defendant's expert could be disciplined for postlitigation failure to report misconduct only if disciplinary authorities were
ready to conclude that the expert committed perjury in testifying on behalf
of the defendant, or that the facts which emerged from the litigation were
so strong that the expert was obliged to change his or her opinion. In
testimony, defense experts frequently point to all of the weak links in the
plaintiffs arguments related to whether the standard of care was violated.
A defense expert's consciousness of those facts might well be sufficient to
convince disciplinary authorities that, even after the defendant lawyer was
found liable for malpractice involving the alleged misconduct, the expert
did not have a "firm opinion" that the defendant lawyer engaged in a
violation of the ethics rules raising a substantial question as to the lawyer's
honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness.
b.

Judicial Findings of No Liability

If a verdict in the malpractice action is returned for the defendant, that
factor is relevant in determining whether the experts who participated on
either side of the litigation have a subsequent duty to report misconduct.

307. See supra Part II(B) (examining the reporting rule's knowledge requirement).
308. See supra Part III(D) (discussing the confidentiality exception to the reporting obligation).
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However, this is true only if the decision was a ruling on the merits of
whether the standard of care was violated, and only if the alleged
malpractice related to the purported misconduct under the disciplinary
rules. In such instances, it could be argued that no expert who participated
in the case would have a post-litigation duty to report misconduct because,
in the face of the substantive ruling, a reasonable lawyer could not form a
firm belief-certainty for all practical purposes 3 0 9-that misconduct had
occurred. The malpractice defendant's triumph in a court of law on the
merits would make it difficult or impossible to conclude that, after the
litigation, the experts "knew" that misconduct had occurred.
Even an expert who originally believed there was serious evidence of
misconduct may be led to question that opinion by the return of an
adverse court ruling. Of course, experts, like the lawyers with whom they
work, sometimes believe that a judge, jury, or appellate court made a bad
decision. Such a belief would not enlarge the scope of the post-litigation
duty to report, if the test is phrased in objective terms.3 1 0 In that case, the
question would be whether a reasonable lawyer would have a firm
conviction that misconduct was committed. Presumably, what the
particular expert personally thought would be irrelevant. However, most
states apply a subjective test in determining whether there is a duty to
report.3 1 1
Of course, many malpractice actions fail for reasons unrelated to the
standard of care. For example, defendants often prevail because a breach
of duty did not cause damage or because the claim was barred by the
statute of limitations. Such rulings are irrelevant to the issue of whether
experts have a post-litigation duty to report, unless the jury made a specific
finding that the standard of care was breached.
c.

Non-Judicial Resolution of Malpractice Claims

Most malpractice cases are resolved by a negotiated settlement or the
plaintiffs abandonment of the claim rather than by a court ruling. It is
therefore important to consider how settlement (before or after trial), or
abandonment of a claim, affects the duty to report.
309. See supra Part II(B)(3) (discussing "substantial certainty" and "firm opinion").
310. See supra Part II(B)(3)(c) (discussing whether the test is subjective or objective).
311. Id. (analyzing the subjective knowledge standard).
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The payment of a settlement is not necessarily an admission of
liability.3 1 2 The settlement may be paid to avoid the expense of
presenting a fully valid defense of malpractice charges. Therefore, the
payment of a settlement does not, by itself, say anything about whether an
expert has a post-litigation duty to report misconduct. The same is true of
abandonment of a claim. A plaintiff may cease prosecution of a
malpractice action for many reasons unrelated to whether misconduct
occurred.
However, in either case-settlement or abandonment-it will be
important to consider whether the facts related to alleged misconduct
became public through testimony or court filings. If those facts never
entered the public domain, it can be argued that whatever the expert
learned remains confidential. In that case, for reasons discussed earlier, the
expert might be found not to have a duty to report misconduct. 3 1 3
D. Misconduct Reported by Others or Publicly Known
The comments to Model Rule 8.3 suggest that, as a practical matter, the
importance of a lawyer's duty to report is to some extent a function of
whether the misconduct in question is otherwise likely to be brought to
light. Thus, the comments state that "[r]eporting a violation is especially
important where the victim is unlikely to discover the offense." 3 1 4
However, there is nothing in the Model Rule, or typical state variations,
which expressly exempts a lawyer from the duty to report merely because a
report has already been made. Yet, if a county attorney has notified
there
disciplinary authorities of a lawyer's conviction of an offense,
would seem to be little use in requiring other lawyers associated with the
case to report the misconduct.
Support for this idea, that duplicative reporting of misconduct is not
312. Cf FED. R. EVID. 408 (stating that evidence of settlement may not be admitted for the
purpose of proving liability).
313. See supra Part III(D) (delineating expectations of confidentiality when information is not
divulged publicly).
314. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 cmt. 1 (2010).
315. See In re Member of the State Bar of Ariz., Gordon M. Wasson, Nos. 03-1206, 04-0523,
2005 WL 6317922, at *2 (Ariz. Disciplinary Comm'n Jan. 20, 2005) (indicating that the "Chief
Deputy County Attorney, Graham County, submitted a complaint to the State Bar of Arizona,
pursuant to ER 8.3(a) [(the Arizona reporting rule)] informing the State Bar of Respondent's
conviction").
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necessary, can be found in commentary. Professors Hazard and Hodes
state, with respect to misconduct by a lawyer in a law firm, "If the partners
or supervisory lawyers in fact reported the misconduct," an associate with
knowledge of the misconduct "would not be required to make a second
redundant report." 3 1 6 However, this would seem to be true only if the
associate had reason to think that the relevant facts had been fully
disclosed. If the associate knew that important information was not
known to, or not disclosed by, the partner or supervising lawyer who made
the report, and was unlikely to come to the attention of disciplinary
authorities, the associate would arguably have an obligation to disclose
those facts.
In In re Daley,' 1 7 a lawyer defending grievance charges argued he was
under no duty to report knowledge of dishonest conduct "because it was
disclosed in a public forum, a court proceeding, and was widely
disseminated the next day in the press, and was disclosed to various law
enforcement agencies including the FBI, Illinois State Police, Illinois
Liquor Commission, United State[s] Attorney and St. Clair County State[]
Attorney's office." 3 8 However, the Illinois Attorney Registration and
Disciplinary Commission found that "the record did not support" the
argument that the other lawyer's misconduct (causing "a false court order
to be filed") was a "matter of general knowledge by the Bench or Bar
which might relieve" a lawyer of reporting duties. 3 '9 The commission
appears to have left open the possibility that, on other facts, such a defense
to a charge of nonreporting might succeed. In Daley, the commission
imposed a nine-month suspension for a variety of misconduct that, in
addition to nonreporting, included multiple failures to communicate with
clients and conflicts of interest. 32 0 Apparently, the sentence would have
been more severe if the initial hearing board had not found that the
defendant lawyer "believed he was not required to report . .. misconduct
under the circumstances," given the "widespread dissemination" of
316. 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 64.7,
at 64-18 (3d ed. Supp. 2009).
317. In re Daley, No. 98 SH 2, 2000 WL 1844454 (Ill. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary
Comm'n Aug. 8, 2000).
318. Id. at *8.
319. Id. at *8-9.
320. Id. at *9, *11.
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information about the misconduct. 3 2 '
E. Relying on Another to Make a Report
A related question is whether one lawyer can rely upon another lawyer
to make a report of misconduct. 3 2 The issue here is essentially whether
an agent can carry out the reporting obligation. It would not be surprising
for disciplinary authorities to take the position that the reporting duty is
nondelegable. That is, if there is a duty to disclose misconduct to
disciplinary authorities, a lawyer who relies on another to make a report is
strictly liable for violation of the reporting rule if the report is not made.
However, there is language in the Restatement which suggests a different
analysis, namely that a lawyer is subject to discipline only for unreasonable
delegation. Discussing the duty of lawyers to report misconduct, the
Restatement opines:
In the case of a junior lawyer in a firm who knows of misconduct by a senior
lawyer, including a supervisory lawyer . . . , reporting the violation to the

firm's managing body or another senior lawyer does not satisfy the
requirement (unless the junior lawyer reasonably assumes in the
circumstances that those informed will report the offense), but may impose a
similar [reporting] requirement on other lawyers thus informed. 3 2 3
This language appears to endorse fault-based liability, rather than strict
liability, for violation of the reporting rule. Of course, the language
quoted from the Restatement is not an exhaustive treatment of the
delegation issue.

321. Id. at '10.
322. Nearly a decade ago, Professor Arthur F. Greenbaum wrote:
As a general matter, the duties of lawyers are singular. Each is charged with following the
rules. Thus, if multiple lawyers witness misconduct, each is required to report it. Similarly,
where both a lawyer and judge witness reportable misconduct in litigation, each may have an
independent duty to report the misconduct to disciplinary authorities, notwithstanding the
action of the other.
Nevertheless, the opinions are not uniform on this point.
Arthur F. Greenbaum, The Attorney's Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap
16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 259, 320-21 (2003) (footnote omitted).
323. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS

§

fir Reform,

5 cmt. i (2000).
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Relying on Another'sJudgmentAbout the Need to Report

If reasonable minds can differ as to whether reporting of misconduct is
required, an associate in a law firm may rely upon a supervising lawyer's
reasonable resolution of that question. 3 2 4 However, if the question is not
debatable, an associate is not relieved of the duty to report merely by the
fact that a more senior lawyer believes a report need not, or should not, be
made, or even instructs the associate not to make a report.
For example, a Connecticut ethics committee addressed a situation
where an associate had knowledge that another associate in the same firm
The committee
had fraudulently altered client-billing statements.3 2
expressed the view that "the question of whether [the other] associate's
conduct 'raises a substantial question' within the meaning of Rule 8.3(a)
'can reasonably be answered only one way."' 3 2 7 Therefore, the associate
requesting the committee's advice was personally required to report the
misconduct "to the Grievance Committee."3 2 8
G.

ContractingAround the Duty to Report
1. Agreements Not to File a Grievance

Can a malpractice defendant and the defendant's expert contractually
agree, either at the outset of their relationship, or at some later stage, that
the expert will not file a grievance as a result of what the expert learns
while working on the case? Presumably not. Any such agreement would
likely be deemed to be void as against public policy. 3 2 9 As the New Jersey
Supreme Court has noted, "Public confidence in the legal profession
would be seriously undermined if we were to permit an attorney to avoid

324. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.2(b) (2010) ("A subordinate lawyer does
not violate the Rules of Professional Conduct if that lawyer acts in accordance with a supervisory
lawyer's reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional duty.").
325. Cf id. R. 5.2(a) ("A lawyer is bound by the Rules of Professional Conduct
notwithstanding that the lawyer acted at the direction of another person.").
326. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'I Ethics, Informal Op. 20 (1996), availableat 1996 WL
785137.
327. Id
328. Id.
329. See Fla. Bar v. Fitzgerald, 541 So. 2d 602, 605 (Fla. 1989) (holding that an agreement not
to bring misconduct to the attention of the bar is unenforceable).

2011]

Legal MalpracticeLitigation and the Duty to Report Misconduct

107

discipline by purchasing the silence of complainants.' 3 3 0
Moreover, by agreeing that a grievance will not be filed, the malpractice
defendant and expert might be deemed to have violated applicable
disciplinary rules. In discussing settlement covenants or other matters not
specifically related to legal malpractice, various authorities have said that
any agreement that one of the parties will not file a grievance is
In many instances, the making, or attempted making, of
unethical. 3
such an agreement is deemed to be conduct "prejudicial to the
administration of justice," 3 3 which in most states is defined as a form of
professional "misconduct." 3 3 3
The underlying principle is broadly
construed. Thus, a Missouri ethics committee opined that "an attorney
who enters into, or attempts to enter into, a settlement that includes a
term that a party to the agreement will withdraw, refrain from filing, or
decline to cooperate regarding,a complaint" violates that state's rule against
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
In some jurisdictions, there is no ethical prohibition against "conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice." For example, in the Texas
ethics code, the drafters substituted the phrase "conduct constituting
which has a very different meaning.3 3
obstruction of justice,"
330. In re Wallace, 518 A.2d 740, 743 (N.J. 1986).
331. "It is generally agreed that settlement of a fee or malpractice dispute can never be
conditioned upon the client's consent not to file a grievance or report the misconduct to the
appropriate disciplinary authority." Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 13
(1997), availableat 1997 WL 700627 (citing ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct,
51:1110).
332. See People v. Vsetecka, 893 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Colo. 1995) (en banc) (per curiam)
(imposing public censure for various misconduct); see also People v. O'Leary, 783 P.2d 843, 846
(Colo. 1989) (en banc) (disbarring an attorney for various misconduct); Fla. Bar v. Frederick, 756
So. 2d 79, 86 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (suspending an attorney for ninety-one days for various
misconduct); In re Wilson, 715 N.E.2d 838, 841-42 (Ind. 1999) (ordering an eighteen-month
suspension for various misconduct); In re Cartmel, 676 N.E.2d 1047, 1050-51 (Ind. 1997) (per
curiam) (enjoining an attorney from practicing law for sixty-days due to various misconduct); In re
Blackwelder, 615 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Ind. 1993) (imposing public reprimand for various misconduct);
In re Tartaglia, 798 N.Y.S.2d 458, 460-61 (App. Div. 2005) (enforcing a five-year suspension for
various misconduct); In re Boothe, 740 P.2d 785, 790-91 (Or. 1987) (requiring a six-month
suspension for various misconduct).
333. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(d) (2010).
334. Mo. Sup. Ct. Advisory Comm., Formal Op. 122 (2006), availableat 2006 WL 6239950
(emphasis added).
335. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.04(d), reprinted in TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (TEx. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9).
336. See Vincent R. Johnson, Ethical Campaigningfur the Judiciary, 29 TEX. TECH L. REV.
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However, even in the absence of a prohibition of "conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice," there may be other grounds for discipline.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court concluded that an agreement for a client
to forebear the filing of a grievance was an improper limitation on a
lawyer's liability to a client for malpractice.
Most state codes, including
33
Texas,
contain that type of ethical restriction. 3 3 9
Some lawyer ethics codes address the issue directly. Connecticut Rule
8.3, immediately after stating the duty to report misconduct by other
lawyers, expressly provides: "A lawyer may not condition settlement of a
civil dispute involving allegations of improprieties on the part of a lawyer
on an agreement that the subject misconduct not be reported to the
appropriate disciplinary authority. "340 A proposed revision of the Texas
reporting rule provided that "[a] lawyer shall not make, or assist a client in
making, any agreement that restricts a lawyer's . . . obligations under this
Rule." 3 4 ' However, the referendum on the proposed change failed to
pass. 3 4 2

811, 830 n.9 4 (1998) (stating that the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct did not
carry forward the "conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice" language that was found in
the pre-1990 Texas Code of Professional Responsibility, but instead replaced it with "a very different
standard which prohibits attorneys from engaging in conduct 'constituting obstruction of justice,"'
which is "substantially narrower"). "The drafters did not intend this new standard to be triggered by
conduct significantly less egregious than that involved in the federal criminal offense of obstruction of
justice or its state counterparts." Id. (citing Robert P. Schuwerk and John F. Sutton, Jr., A Guide to
the Texas Disciplinary Rules ofProfessionalConduct,27A HOUS. L. REV. 1, 475 (1990)).
337. See Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Colston, 777 P.2d 920, 925 (Okla. 1989) (finding that a lawyer's
"attempt[] to limit his liability to a client by offering her $5,000.00 in exchange for an agreement not
to pursue the bar grievance" was a "clear violation of the Professional Responsibility Code" because a
"member of the bar is guilty of misconduct when he (or she) attempts to exonerate himself from, or
limit his liability to, a client for the commission of personal malpractice").
338. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.08(h), reprintedin TEX. GOV'T
CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (TEX. STATE BAR R. art. X, § 9) (restricting
agreements limiting liability for malpractice).
8
339. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1. (g) (2010) (imposing conditions on
agreements limiting liability for malpractice).
340. CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2010).
341. Approval of Referendum on Proposed Amendments to the Texas Discrplinary Rules of

ProfessionalConduct, 73 TEX. B.J. 898, 973 (2010).
342. State Bar of Texas Referendum 2011 Results, 74 TEX. B.J. 195, 195 (2011).
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2.
Hiring the Expert to Provide Counsel Relating to a Possible
Grievance
Rather than secure a promise that a grievance will not be filed by an
expert, a malpractice defendant might seek to achieve the same result by
hiring the expert to provide legal counsel with regard to disciplinary
consequences that might arise from the malpractice case. The idea would
be to create a lawyer-client relationship which would oblige the expert,
now acting as counsel, to keep the relevant facts confidential.3 4 3
However, it is often the case that what cannot be done directly, cannot be
done indirectly. Thus, it seems likely that disciplinary authorities might
treat this type of arrangement as another form of conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice.
That would certainly be an appropriate line
of analysis if the lawyer-client relationship were nothing more than a sham
to defeat the policies underlying the duty to report.3 1 5 It might be easy to
conclude that such a post-malpractice-litigation agreement to provide
counsel relating to a possible grievance lacks bona fides. This is true
because, if the expert has a duty to report the misconduct, there is arguably
a conflict of interest that requires the expert to decline a post-litigation
engagement proffered by the malpractice defendant. 3 46
Moreover, there is authority that "the duty to report misconduct
'implies a duty by the subject attorney not to frustrate that process, and
[that] an attempt to interfere in the grievance process is a basis for
discipline."' 3 4 7 Therefore, both parties to a specious attorney-client
relationship might be subject to discipline: the lawyer-client for having

343. See supra Part III (analyzing the confidentiality limitation on disclosure).
344. See supra Part VI(G) (discussing conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).
345. See supra Part VI(G) (stating that agreements not to file a grievance are presumptively void
as a matter of public policy).
346. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a) (2010) ("A concurrent conflict of
interest exists if . .. there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be
materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to ... a third person or by a personal interest of the
lawyer.").
347. See Alex B. Long, Whistleblowing Attorneys and Ethical Infrastructures, 68 MD. L. REV.
786, 817 (2009) (quoting Iowa Sup. Ct. Bd. of Prof'1 Ethics & Conduct v. Miller, 568 N.W.2d 665,
667 (Iowa 1997)) (holding that a lawyer's demand that her former employer withdraw a complaint
against her warranted indefinite suspension with no possibility of reinstatement for sixty days); see also
In re Discipline of Eicher, 661 N.W.2d 354, 365 (S.D. 2003) ("The duty to report disciplinary
violations also embraces a responsibility not to frustrate the reporting by others or dissuading others
from cooperating in disciplinary investigations.").
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violated the obligation implied by the terms of the reporting rule, and the
expert for having assisted those acts of misconduct.3 48
It is useful to remember that disciplinary authorities have been assiduous
in addressing interference with the disciplinary process. For example, in In
re Discipline ofEicher, ' the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that a
lawyer engaged in professional misconduct by proposing that, if a
disciplinary complaint against him were withdrawn, he would not appeal a
trial court's decision in his client's underlying action. 3 5 0
3.

Mixing the Roles of Consulting and Testifying Expert

In a widely noted ethics opinion, Formal Opinion 97-407, a committee
of the American Bar Association took the position that the role of a
testifying expert is different from the role of a consulting expert, and that
the distinction carries with it important consequences. 3 5 ' According to
the opinion, which is generally well-regarded,
the hallmark of a
testifying expert is independence and objectivity, 5 3 whereas a consulting
expert's role is more akin to that of a partisan advocate serving as a type of
Due in part to this distinction, there is normally
associated co-counsel.3
no attorney-client relationship between a testifying expert and the person
on whose behalf the expert has been engaged, but there is a lawyer-client
relationship between a consulting expert and that type of person. From
the perspective of the testifying expert, this view has several advantages.
The testifying expert's range of future potential conflicts of interest is
limited because the former-client conflict of interest rule3 5 5 is
348. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.4(a) (2010) (providing that "[ilt is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate .. . the Rules of Professional Conduct .. . [or]
knowingly assist .. . another to do so").
349. In re Discipline of Eicher, 661 N.W.2d 354 (S.D. 2003).
350. Id. at 364, 371 (finding that the proposal violated the duties imposed by the reporting
rule and imposing a 100-day suspension for various acts of misconduct).
351. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997).
352. But see Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers as Witnesses, 36 N.M. L. REV. 47, 66 (2006)
(criticizing Formal Opinion 97-407's conclusion that "testifying lawyer-experts do not share
attorney-client relationships with the parties for whom they testify").
353. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) (opining that
a testifying expert "is presented as objective and must provide opinions adverse to the party for whom
he expects to testify if frankness so dictates").
354. See id. (stating that "zealous partisan advocacy [is] characteristic of an expert consultant").
355. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.9 (2010) (addressing former-client
conflicts of interest).
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inapplicable. Further, because the testifying expert has no "client," the
chances of being sued for malpractice are greatly reduced.3 5 6
However, Formal Opinion 97-407 acknowledged that sometimes the
dividing line between consulting expert and testifying expert is blurred,
and that an expert could serve in both capacities. 3 5 7 The committee
cautioned that:
When this blending of roles occurs, the lawyer whose principal role is to
testify as an expert nevertheless may become an expert consultant and as
such, bound by all of the Model Rules as co-counsel to the law firm's client.
The lawyer expert then must exercise special care to assure that the law firm
and the client are fully informed and expressly consent to the lawyer
continuing to serve as a testifying expert, reminding them that his testifying
may require the disclosure of confidences and may adversely affect the
lawyer's expert testimony by undermining its objectivity. 3 5 8
One further consequence of mixing the roles of consulting and testifying
experts is that the expert may stand in a different position with respect to a
post-litigation duty to report serious misconduct by another lawyer. 3 5 9
The expert who serves in both roles could presumably argue in good faith
that the information relating to misconduct is "protected by Rule 1.6," or
more specifically the parallel state law provision, and that absent client
consent, or some other exception to the ethical obligation of
confidentiality, reporting is neither required nor permitted.3 6 0
VII.

CONCLUSION

As the preceding discussion suggests, there are many unanswered
questions relating to whether lawyers serving as expert witnesses in legal
malpractice cases have a duty to report knowledge of serious professional
misconduct that emerges from the facts of malpractice litigation. Yet it
356. See VINCENT R. JOHNSON, LEGAL MALPRACTICE LAW IN A NUTSHELL 160 (West
2011) (asserting that "[ilt is still true, and probably always will be, that nonclients have a harder time
than clients holding lawyers accountable for the losses they sustain"). Expert witness malpractice is a
theory of liability that is virtually unknown. Id. at 85-86.
357. See ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 407 (1997) (indicating
that this may be true because "[tihe testifying expert may sometimes become involved in discussion of
tactical or strategic issues of the case, or become privy to confidential information pertaining to the
case").
358. Id.
359. Id
360. Douglas R. Richmond, Lawyers as Witnesses, 36 N.M. L. REV. 47, 61 (2006).
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seems clear that courts and ethics committees will begin to address these
issues as legal malpractice law, and related litigation, continues to grow as
an important field of law.
Experts seeking to escape the obligation to report malpractice-related
misconduct may hope that courts will eventually take the position that
experts, as subagents of the lawyers who hire them, 3 6 1 "stand in the shoes"
of those lawyers; that what they learn about the case is confidential client
information "protected by Rule 1.6,"1362 and that absent client consent or
some other exception to confidentiality, 3 6 3 reporting misconduct is not
required by the applicable version of Model Rule 8.3. However, this view
of experts' obligations, while plausible, is not yet the law. Experts must
therefore struggle with analyzing their own ethical obligations, just as they
scrutinize the obligations of malpractice defendants.
In determining whether to make a report of misconduct, a legal
malpractice expert may benefit from seeking the guidance of another
That consultant may
lawyer not involved in the underlying case.
"bring a measure of objectivity to the analysis that might otherwise be
difficult to achieve." 3 6 5 Disclosure of otherwise confidential information
for the purpose of seeking ethics advice is generally regarded as ethically
permissible and appropriate. 3 6 6
Experts who err on the side of caution by reporting misconduct, which
they may have a duty to disclose, have little risk of liability arising from
that disclosure. In most states, a person who files a grievance is protected

361. See supra text accompanying note 198 (discussing reporting duties in light of agency
principles).
362. See supra Part III(D) (discussing the meaning of "protected by Rule 1.6").
363. See supra Part III(A) (analyzing the exceptions to the confidentiality limitation on
disclosure).
364. Cf ABA Comm. on Ethics & Profl Responsibility, Formal Op. 431 (2003) (suggesting
that, in determining whether to report an apparently impaired lawyer to disciplinary authorities, "a
lawyer might consider consulting with a psychiatrist, clinical psychologist, or other mental health care
professional about the significance of the conduct observed or of information the lawyer has learned
from third parties").
365. Conn. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Profl Ethics, Informal Op. 13 n. 1 (2004), availableat 2004
WL 3413897 (indicating that the consultation must be done in accordance with rules governing
confidentiality of client information).
366. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(b)(4) (2010) ("A lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes
necessary ... to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules.").
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from liability for defamation by an absolute privilege. 3 6 7

367. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING
§ 64.4, at 64-11 (3d ed. Supp. 2009) (indicating that in most states the privilege does not turn on
good faith or good cause); see also Weber v. Cueto, 568 N.E.2d 513, 519-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(finding incidental references to a nonlawyer to be absolutely privileged). In many states, the
immunity is statutory. For example, a Texas statute provides: "No lawsuit may be instituted against
any Complainant or witness predicated upon the filing of a Grievance or participation in the attorney
disciplinary and disability system.... The immunity is absolute and unqualified and extends to all
actions at law or in equity." TEx. RULEs DISCIPLINARY P. R. 15.09, rep nted in TEX. GOv'T CODE
ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A-1 (West 2005).

